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ABSTRACT 
In the first essay, utilizing a more recent and expanded 20-year sample 1991-2010 of dual-
rated bonds issued, I confirm Morgan’s (2002) finding that banks are relatively more opaque 
than nonbanks.  The likelihood of a rating split is higher, and the magnitude of the rating gap is 
larger, for banks than nonbanks.  Moreover, rating agency disagreements are more significant for 
banks with relatively higher loan and trading securities holdings and maintain lower capital, and 
for banks engaged in mortgage securitization.  Importantly, I find that rating agency 
disagreements reflect market proxies of information uncertainty.  Further, opacity makes external 
financing more costly.  Equity returns surrounding new bond issues are significantly negative on 
average, and notably lower, when information uncertainty is higher and for banks compared to 
nonbanks. 
In the second essay I investigate how corporate governance is related to bank opacity and 
how bank opacity is related to systematic and systemic risk.  It is well known that opaque assets 
lead to higher systematic risk, which contributes to higher systemic risk.  Banks by nature hold a 
large percentage of opaque assets, but the decision to hold such assets is partly endogenous.  
Results show that banks with relatively weak corporate governance hold a larger share of opaque 
assets.  Consequently, they operate further along the risk-return frontier and have higher 
exposure to systemic risk.  At the margin, strong corporate governance at publicly traded U.S. 
banking organizations reduces financial instability. 
In the third essay I examine if the rating agencies sacrifice the rating timeliness for the sake 
of rating stability.  Credit rating agencies argue that markets expect them to issue stable ratings. 
Examining equity market reactions around CreditWatch events in 2002-2005, I find that the 
pursuit of stable rating may have reduced the timeliness of rating changes.  Abnormal equity 
returns of a firm prior to being listed on CreditWatch are effective predictors of the ultimate 
change in rating that occurs when the firm is delisted.  Equity markets exhibit no reaction when a 
firm is delisted from CreditWatch, suggesting information about the rating change is already 
reflected in equity prices at the time of delisting. 
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Introduction 
 
The dissertation is inspired by the recent financial crisis, focusing primarily on bank opacity, 
corporate governance, and credit ratings.  First, utilizing a more recent and expanded 20-year 
sample 1991-2010 of dual-rated bonds issued, I find that banks are relatively more opaque than 
other industries. Moreover, I find that rating agency disagreements reflect market proxies of 
information uncertainty as captured by analyst coverage, standard deviation and absolute error of 
analyst earnings forecasts, trading volume and bid-ask spreads.  Further, opacity increases the 
informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, and makes external financing more 
costly.   
The process of how systemic risks occur is a very interesting question.  The second essay 
addresses the question of how corporate governance plays a role in banks’ systemic risks through 
managers’ choices of bank assets.  The results suggest that corporate governance, such as 
managerial incentives, ownership, and board structures, influence banks’ choices of opaque 
assets, and that opaque assets held by banks lead to more systematic risk for investors and more 
systemic risk for society.   
In the third essay, I examine the issue of timeliness when rating agencies announce the 
potential default risk.  Rating agencies on one hand are expected by the market to convey long-
term, permanent, and structural changes of firms’ default risk and thus only to make rating 
changes when a reversal in rating changes in the near future is unlikely. On the other hand, rating 
agencies are expected to convey information about the default risk of firms to the market in a 
timely fashion so that investors can use the timely information in pricing securities prices.  The 
results suggest rating agencies sacrifice rating timeliness for the sake of rating stability. 
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                    Are Banks Really Opaque:  Evidence from 1991-2010 
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A.     Introduction 
  The informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders is a primary reason for the 
existence of financial intermediaries (Leland and Pyle, 1977).  Banks are delegated monitors for 
outside capital (Diamond, 1984) and provide liquidity for demand deposits (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983). The nature of its lending activities as well as the moral hazard of deposit 
insurance, which distinguish banks from nonbanks, also make banks opaque. 
  Opacity is the information uncertainty that even the most sophisticated investors face in 
accurately assessing the fundamental value of a firm that arises from insufficient disclosure or 
inherent complexity of firms.  Because it is difficult for the market to assess the intrinsic value of 
banks, the problems of “sick” banks will infect “healthy” banks, which can provoke self-
fulfilling large bank failures (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  The limitations to informed arbitrage 
and threat of insolvency associated with opacity contributes to systemic risk and the fragility of 
the real economy. Governmental regulation and supervision are necessary because market 
discipline may be ineffective when banks are opaque. 
  The adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with information asymmetry 
make external financing costly for firms (Myers and Majluf, 1984).Relative to equity, debt 
financing is least costly for the uninformed investor.  Collateralization and the fixed payoff of 
debt minimize the private information advantage of insiders about future cash flows.  Moreover, 
the discipline of interest and principal repayments, debt covenants, and monitoring by 
independent third parties (credit rating agencies) constrain the agency costs of excess cash flow. 
Firms have a strong incentive to issue debt because the value of debt is least sensitive ex ante to 
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public signals.1  But debt is risky ex post.  A sufficiently bad aggregate economic shock that 
reduces the value of collateral and the adequacy of capital can make debt information sensitive, 
and thereby, trigger systemic risk (Dang, Gorton, and Holmström, 2009). 
  In this study we use new debt issues by publicly traded firms over the 20-year period 
1991−2010 as the market event for examining the economic impact of information uncertainty.  
And as in Morgan (2002), that spans an earlier decade 1983-1993, rating agency disagreements 
between Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are used to proxy for information uncertainty.  We 
confirm that banks are still relatively more opaque than nonbanks.  Rating splits are more likely, 
and the magnitudes of rating gaps are larger, for banks than for firms in other industries.  
Moreover, rating agency disagreements are more significant for banks, with relatively higher 
loan and trading securities holdings and lower capital, and that participated in mortgage 
securitization activities.  The deregulation of the banking industry, which intensified competition 
and reduced the discipline of charter value, also contributed to increased information uncertainty 
about banks.  Recognizing that only comparatively high quality debt could be issued during the 
2008 financial crisis, the pattern of rating disagreements pre-crisis and post-crisis suggests that 
the quality of bank debt issues improved in the years leading up to 2008 and remained relatively 
high subsequently. 
  Using market proxies for information uncertainty, this study also revisits Flannery, Kwan, 
and Nimalendran’s(2004), which spans the period 1990-1997,and argues that banks are not 
opaque but simply boring.  In contrast to Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran(2004), we find that 
rating agency disagreements are more likely when: analyst coverage is limited; the dispersion of 
                                                 
1Moreover, faced with the choice of public or private (bank) debt, firms will choose private 
debt when the rigidity of bond covenants exceeds the agency cost of monitoring (Berlin and 
Loeys, 1988).   
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analyst earnings are high, and accuracy of analyst earnings, are low; bid-ask spreads are high; 
and trading volume is low.  These findings corroborate Livingston, Naranjo, and Zhou (2007) 
that ratings disagreements imbed market proxies of information uncertainty.  
  Last but not least, we show that opacity makes external financing by firms more costly.  
Equity returns surrounding new debt issues are significantly negative on average, and more 
negative, when information uncertainties about firms, captured either through rating agency 
disagreements or market proxies, are high.  Moreover, controlling for market proxies of 
information uncertainty, equity returns surrounding new debt issues by banks are significantly 
more negative compared to nonbanks when rating agency disagreements are more substantial.  
These results are consistent with Livingston and Zhou’s (2010) finding that yield spreads are 
higher for new debt issues that are split-rated, and increase, with the magnitude of the rating gap. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the research design.  Empirical 
results are presented and discussed in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes. 
B.     Empirical Design 
B.1   Research Questions 
  This study examines three distinct but related issues.  First, has the information uncertainty 
of banks relative to nonbanks changed in the recent two decades 1991-2010 compared to the 
decade prior? The sample period covers three major deregulatory events – the demise of “too big 
to fail” after 1986, the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1998, as well the financial crisis of 2008.Moreover, is the 
information uncertainty for banks related to its asset composition, securitization activities, and 
capital?  Second, are market proxies of information asymmetry and credit ratings disagreements 
consistent and complementary indicators of information uncertainty? Third, do equity markets 
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price information uncertainty? 
B.2    Information Uncertainty 
  New issues of debt by publicly traded firms are used as the natural market experiment for 
examining information uncertainty. Issue data was obtained from Thomson Financial over the 
20-year period January 1991 through December 2010 covered in its SDC Platinum Global New 
Issues database.  As in Cantor and Packer (1996), new debt issues under $10 million and less 
than one year of maturity are excluded, as are issues with significant equity features, equipment 
trusts, collateralized mortgage obligations, government guaranteed issues, variable rate issues, 
ESOP, lease certificates, and foreign issues.  Further, as in Morgan (2002), new debt is restricted 
to issues rated both by the two major rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.  The 
reasoning is simply that rating agencies in the business of assessing risk will disagree more when 
information uncertainty about the issuer is high.   
  Bond maturity is the number of years between issue and maturity dates, and face value, is 
expressed in denominations of $10 million.  As detailed in Appendix A, letter ratings by the two 
agencies are mapped into a single numeric scale, with better credit quality indicated by lower 
numbers: AAA = Aaa = 1, AA+ = Aal =2,…,C = C = 21.Issuers are also classified into ten 
industries as in Morgan (2002).  Firms with SIC codes of 6021, 6022, 6029, 6712, or 6719 are 
classified as banks, and the SIC codes used to construct the nine other industries are detailed in 
Appendix B. 
  Average Rating is the mean of Moody's and S&P numerical ratings with higher values 
indicating higher risk. Variances in ratings across and within issuers are depicted separately.  
Standard deviation in ratings between is the average standard deviation across issues in the same 
industry, and standard deviation in ratings within, is the average standard deviation across issues 
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by the same issuer.  Smaller variances between firms suggest a central tendency in rating 
distributions, and larger variances within firms, imply higher ratings ambiguity.   
  Rating gaps as well as rating splits describe rating agency disagreements.  Rating gap is the 
absolute difference between Moody’s and S&P ratings, and information uncertainty about a 
firm’s true risks will, ex post, cause rating agencies to underrate some relatively safe and 
overrate some relatively risky bonds.  Kappa is a statistical measure of inter-rater reliability that 
takes into account that agreement can occur by chance, and is defined as , 
where  is the percentage of same-rated bonds observed and is the expected percentage given 
the distribution of ratings. Kappa equals1, if the raters are in complete agreement, and equals 0, 
if there is no agreement among the raters. 
  This study’s sample over the more recent 20-year period January 1, 1991 through 
December 31, 2010, contains 25,652 new bond issues by 2,505 unique firms, of which, 3,868 are 
issued by 164 unique banks.  Table 1 reports summary statistics on issue and issuer 
characteristics both for the overall sample period as well as for two non-overlapping 10-year sub-
periods compared to Morgan’s (2002) sample over an earlier ten-and-a-half year period January 
1983 to July 1993.  Note that in this study’s sample:(i) the average annual number of issues and 
number of issues per issuer is higher; (ii) the average issue size is larger; and (iii) the average 
issue maturities are shorter.  Moreover, contrasting the most recent decade with the decade prior, 
average face value are almost five-times higher and average maturities about fifty percent longer, 
for bonds issued by banks compared to non-banks.  But the distributions of issues across 
industries, as well as average ratings and standard deviation of ratings, are similar.  
  Debt issues by banks are better rated on average quality, by almost two notches, compared 
to debt issues by firms in other industries. The between variance on bank issues is only half that 
[P
0
− P
e
]/[100 − P
e
]
P
0
P
e
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Table 1:  Ratings and New Bond Issue Characteristics by Issuer Type 
Summary statistics covers 25,652 new bonds issued from 1991 through 2010.  Issues/Issuers 
stand for the total number of bond issues and unique bond issuers across industries. Letter ratings 
by the two agencies are transformed into a numeric scale and better letter ratings correspond to 
lower numbers. aAverage Rating is the average of Moody’s and S&P ratings.  bStandard 
Deviation in Ratings Between and Within are the average standard deviations across issues in the 
same industry and across issues by the same issuer, respectively. cAll Other refers to agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, and construction. Numeric ratings and SIC codes used to classify industries are 
detailed in Appendices A and B. 
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  Standard Deviation 
in Ratings 
Average 
Maturity 
(years) 
Average 
Face Value            
($millions) 
Morgan (2002) Sample: 1983-1993  Average 
Ratinga Issuer Type Issues /Issuers Betweenb Withinb 
  
 
  
  
       Bank           848/220 5.29 2.98 1.20 8.40 158.80 
Other 7,014/2,410 7.14 5.48 0.94 13.50 176.80 
     Manufacturing         1,858/661 8.52 4.49 1.03 14.20 201.00 
     Mining            107/43 10.92 3.13 0.74 14.30 172.90 
     Trade  511/217 10.08 3.86 1.05 14.70 147.60 
     Services 341/161 10.72 3.34 1.37 12.80 125.50 
     Transportation 182/63 9.41 4.11 1.26 15.30 165.40 
     Public utilities 1,884/360 6.93 3.89 0.86 19.10 133.70 
     Insurance 150/59 6.23 4.31 0.83 14.00 138.10 
     Other Finance and Real Estate 1,941/810 4.15 3.19 0.80 6.60 217.30 
     All Otherc 40/29 12.36 3.65 0.42 11.20 131.90 
       
   
Standard Deviation 
in Ratings 
Average 
Maturity 
(years) 
Average 
Face Value            
($millions) 
New Sample: 1991-2010  Average 
Rating Issuer Type Issues /Issuers Between Within 
  
 
  
  
       Bank           3,868/146 5.25 1.69 0.72 6.12 321.03 
Other 21,784/2,359 8.61 3.39 0.84 10.19 280.17 
     Manufacturing         4,157/761 8.16 3.76 0.90 10.44 312.24 
     Mining            760/196 10.77 3.68 0.68 11.53 321.63 
     Trade  1,120/218 8.70 4.08 0.97 11.12 312.54 
     Services 1,341/313 9.97 4.02 0.75 7.98 318.54 
     Transportation 507/67 8.59 3.66 0.97 12.77 284.55 
     Public utilities 2,890/405 8.42 3.61 1.18 12.95 214.19 
     Insurance 687/127 8.64 3.67 0.87 12.73 296.89 
     Other Finance and Real Estate 10,051/226 5.01 2.62 0.49 4.89 236.34 
     All Other 271/46 11.45 2.49 0.97 8.77 179.51 
       
 
     Subsample: 1991-2000 
    
       
       Bank           2,369/110 5.70 1.61 0.72 5.44 127.11 
Other 12,540/1,634 8.26 3.24 0.58 10.46 163.88 
     Manufacturing         2,287/540 7.69 3.57 0.55 11.01 177.15 
     Mining            370/118 9.89 3.63 0.56 12.87 169.74 
     Trade  635/155 8.11 3.77 0.60 11.99 182.55 
     Services 769/191 9.10 3.80 0.45 7.32 180.08 
     Transportation 317/51 8.50 3.06 1.01 14.19 150.99      
     Public utilities 1,702/291 8.07 3.66 0.52 12.87 202.12      
     Insurance 276/86 6.35 2.43 0.49 11.13 174.41 
     Other Finance and Real Estate 6,072/167 5.17 2.49 0.34 4.31 116.91 
     All Other 112/35 11.42 2.70 0.70 8.47 121.00 
       
      Subsample: 2001-2010 
 
 
  
  
       
       Bank           1,499/69 4.54 1.55 0.59 7.18 627.51 
Other 9,244/1,392 9.03 3.51 0.79 9.82 417.35 
     Manufacturing         1,870/472 8.72 3.91 0.74 9.75 477.45 
     Mining            390/115 11.59 3.53 0.60 10.27 465.73 
     Trade  485/117 9.46 4.35 0.73 9.99 482.73 
     Services 572/185 11.13 4.02 0.68 8.87 504.68 
     Transportation 190/35  8.29 4.38 1.21 10.87 319.62 
     Public utilities 1,188/238 9.45 3.53 0.91 12.53 432.66 
     Insurance 411/73 6.38 2.70 0.70 11.41 433.96 
     Other Finance and Real Estate 3,979/130 4.77 2.79 0.47 5.77 418.59 
     All Other 159/27 11.47 2.34 1.03 8.98 220.72 
       
on nonbank issues, which suggests that ratings on bank debt tend to cluster around the mean. The 
within variance is, however, higher for bank issues, which indicates that individual bank risks 
change more over time.  Contrasting the most recent decade with the decade prior, ratings for 
bank compared to non-bank debt issues improved by more than one notch and within standard 
deviation in ratings decreased by almost twenty percent. 
  Table 2 reports unconditional measures of rater disagreement across industries.  Debt issues 
by banks have the highest average credit quality, followed closely by companies in other finance 
and real estate as well as in insurance.  But there is considerably greater information uncertainty 
about the risk of banks.   
  The gap between the mean ratings by Moody's and S&P is more than fifty percent higher 
for bank issues than for the typical nonbank issue.  The rank correlation between ratings across 
issues within the same industry, though high in all industries, is lowest for banks.  The average 
Kappa statistic, which reflects the degree of agreement between rater, is lowest for banks. The 
relatively high average Kappa for finance and other real estate is predictable since these issues 
tend to be backed by a pool of specific, homogenous assets ‘locked’ up in special purpose 
vehicles that reduce the risk of asset substitution.  The average Kappa is highest for issues by 
mining companies, which is surprising since industry cash flows are notably risky, but perhaps 
less subject to managerial misappropriation because of stringent regulation.   
  Rating splits are considerably more frequent for banks and insurance companies, and least 
frequent, for other finance and real estate.  The pattern of splits also shows that when a split 
occurs, the likelihood of a one-notch rating gap is relatively the same across industries except for 
other finance and real estate.  However, compared to other industries, a rating gap of one or more 
notches is most likely in split rated debt issued by banks and insurance companies. 
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Table 2:  Rating Agency Disagreements over New Bond Issues by Sector 
 
Table reports various measures of disagreement between raters. aCorrelation is the rank correlation in ratings across firms in the same 
industry between issuers. bKappa statistics are defined as [P0- Pe ]/[100 - Pe],where P0 is the percentage of similar-rated bonds 
observed, and Pe is the expected percentage given the distribution of ratings. As a measure of inter-rater reliability, a Kappa value 
equal to 0 represents complete disagreement, and to 1, complete agreement. cAbsolute gap is the absolute value of the rating split 
between Moody’s and S&P.  cRatings gap distributions are the percentages expressed relative to the number of split-rated issues. eAll 
Other refers to agriculture, forestry, fishing, and construction. Numeric ratings and SIC codes used to classify industries are detailed in 
Appendices A and B. 
 
       
Morgan (2002) Sample: 1983-1993 
Average Ratings 
Moody’s/S&P 
Correlation 
between 
Ratingsa 
 
      Kappa 
Statisticsb 
Moody’s 
≠ S&P 
(% of issues) 
Average 
Absolute 
Gapc 
Return Gap Distributiond 
(percentage) 
Issuer Type Gap=1 Gap=2 Gap=3 
 
     
   
         
Bank           5.5/5.1 0.91 0.30 
 
62.9 0.83 44.81 15.57 2.48 
Other 7.2/7.1 0.97 0.45 50.0 0.65 38.80 9.27 2.67 
     Manufacturing         8.5/8.6 0.97 0.39 56.3 0.74 42.30 10.76 3.22 
     Mining            11.1/10.8 0.95 0.23 71.0 0.93 50.47 18.69 1.86 
     Trade  10.1/10.1 0.97 0.30 63.6 0.81 48.92 11.74 2.94 
     Services 10.7/10.7 0.97 0.38 56.3 0.68 45.75 9.68 0.88 
     Transportation 9.6/9.2 0.95 0.37 57.1 0.76 42.31 10.44 4.40 
     Public Utilities 6.9/7.0 0.96 0.45 50.1 0.62 40.34 7.75 2.02 
     Insurance 6.7/5.8 0.94 0.09 81.3 1.33 44.67 22.00 14.67 
     Other Finance and Real Estate 4.2/4.1 0.96 0.57 34.8 0.46 25.81 7.01 1.95 
     All Othere 12.5/12.2 0.96 0.30 60.0 0.73 50.00 7.50 2.50 
         
 
      
New Sample: 1991-2010 
Average Ratings 
Moody’s/S&P 
Correlation 
between 
Ratings 
 
      Kappa 
 Statistics 
Moody’s 
≠ S&P 
(% of issues) 
Average 
Absolute 
Gap 
Return Gap Distribution 
(percentage) 
Issuer Type Gap=1 Gap=2 Gap=3 
 
     
   
         
Bank           4.96/5.54 0.82 0.22 65.2 0.94 40.33 22.08 2.76 
Other 8.69/8.53 0.95 0.52 45.6 0.60 35.64 6.93 2.68 
     Manufacturing         8.24/8.07 0.97 0.50 45.9 0.57 37.31 6.69 1.92 
     Mining            10.88/10.66 0.97 0.71 47.4 0.61 37.24 8.42 1.71 
     Trade  8.71/8.69 0.97 0.44 51.6 0.64 43.48 4.64 3.49 
     Services 10.08/9.86 0.98 0.46 48.8 0.59 41.09 6.34 1.41 
     Transportation 8.53/8.30 0.90 0.48 48.9 0.74 33.93 8.09 4.13 
     Public utilities 8.69/8.58 0.96 0.46 49.5 0.65 39.24 7.54 2.67 
     Insurance 6.63/6.10 0.93 0.42 50.8 0.72 34.21 12.23 4.37 
     Other Finance and Real Estate 5.00/5.02 0.96 0.66 28.4 0.36 22.18 4.76 1.45 
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Subsample: 1991-2000 
Average Ratings 
Moody’s/S&P 
Correlation 
between 
Ratings 
 
Kappa 
Statistics 
Moody’s 
≠ S&P 
(% of issues) 
Average 
Absolute 
Gap 
Return Gap Distribution 
(percentage) 
Issuer Type Gap=1 Gap=2 Gap=3 
 
     
   
         Bank           5.6/5.9 0.80 0.37 56.2 0.79 38.37 14.61 3.25 
Other 8.3/8.2 0.95 0.47 46.9 0.62 37.33 6.18 3.24 
     Manufacturing         7.8/7.6 0.97 0.49 45.2 0.55 38.92 4.20 2.09 
     Mining            10.0/9.8 0.97 0.48 47.8 0.59 38.92 7.84 1.08 
     Trade  8.0/8.2 0.96 0.41 53.4 0.70 44.88 2.68 5.83 
     Services 9.2/9.0 0.97 0.45 49.0 0.59 41.61 5.59 1.82 
     Transportation 8.5/8.5 0.95 0.45 47.9 0.62 37.54 7.89 2.52 
     Public Utilities 8.1/8.0 0.95 0.43 51.3 0.69 40.72 7.2 3.37 
     Insurance 6.7/6.0 0.92 0.36 55.8 0.82 36.59 13.41 5.79 
     Other Finance and Real Estate 5.2/5.1 0.95 0.65 27.3 0.37 19.96 5.62 1.68 
     All Otherc 11.3/11.5 0.89 0.47 44.6 0.66 37.50 2.68 4.47 
         
 
      Subsample: 2001-2010 
Average Ratings 
Moody’s/S&P 
Correlation 
between 
Ratings 
 
Kappa 
Statistics 
Moody’s 
≠ S&P 
(% of issues) 
Average 
Absolute 
Gap 
Return Gap Distribution 
(percentage) 
Issuer Type Gap=1 Gap=2 Gap=3 
 
     
   
         Bank           4.01/5.06 0.84 0.05 79.3 1.18 43.43 33.89 1.99 
Other 9.14/8.92 0.95 0.51 43.7 0.60 33.83 7.65 2.26 
     Manufacturing         8.83/8.61 0.97 0.49 46.8 0.61 35.35 9.73 1.71 
     Mining            11.74/11.45 0.97 0.49 46.9 0.62 35.64 8.97 2.31 
     Trade  9.59/9.33 0.98 0.46 49.3 0.57 41.65 7.22 0.41 
     Services 11.24/11.03 0.98 0.47 48.6 0.58 40.38 7.34 0.87 
     Transportation 8.57/8.01 0.87 0.51 43.1 0.93 27.89 8.42 6.85 
     Public utilities 9.48/9.41 0.96 0.48 46.8 0.60 37.12 7.91 1.77 
     Insurance 6.60/6.16 0.94 0.46 47.5 0.66 32.60 11.44 3.40 
     Other Finance and Real Estate 4.70/4.84 0.97 0.64 30.1 0.36 25.56 3.44 1.10 
     All Otherc 11.48/11.45 0.95 0.60 34.6 0.43 28.30 4.40 1.89 
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   Between the recent and preceding decade, assessments of industry risk by rating agencies 
remained relatively unchanged except for banks.  Between decades, the average rating on bank 
debt was about a notch higher and the rank correlation of ratings on bank debt was similar.  
Kappa statistics show, however, that ratings agreement on bank debt issues fell to almost zero in 
the recent decade.  Between decades, the rating split frequency of bank debt increased from 
56.2% to 79.3%, the absolute rating gap from 0.79 to 1.18, and the likelihood of a rating gap of 
one or more from   56.23% to 79.31%. 
 B.3 Market Proxies for Information Uncertainty 
  This study, which explores whether rating agency disagreements mirror market proxies of 
information uncertainty, extends Morgan (2002).  Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) 
argue that if banks are relatively more opaque than nonbanks, equity markets will imbed more 
divergent opinions about the future earnings and stock prices of banks.  In particular, the 
dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts, bid-ask spreads, trading volumes, and 
return volatilities will reflect information uncertainty.  In a cross-sectional analysis over the 
period 1990-1997, Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) find no statistically significant 
difference between banks and other industries.  The quoted bids-ask spreads, effective spreads, 
and adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads are very similar between banks and 
nonbanks and across large NYSE-traded and small NASDAQ-traded banks.  NASDAQ-traded 
banks appear to have lower trading volumes compared to nonbanks, and analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings, to be more accurate for banks.   
  These findings differ from extant literature.  Using intraday stock transactions data, 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) show that a larger analyst following tends to reduce 
information asymmetry.  Desai, Nimalendran, and Venkataraman (1998) find significant changes 
13 
13 
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in trading activity, volatility, and adverse information component of the bid-ask spread following 
a stock split.  Livingston, Naranjo, and Zhou (2007) show that rating splits are more likely for 
firms with higher adverse information component in the bid-ask spread, higher standard 
deviation of analyst earnings forecasts and absolute forecast errors, and smaller analyst coverage.  
And in a subsequent paper, Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2010) note that a dramatic shift 
in the equity trading characteristics of bank stocks during the 2007 financial crisis is consistent 
with increased information uncertainty. 
  As in Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004), we use the bid-ask spread as a percentage 
of share price, trading volume, number of stock analysts, standard deviation of quarterly analyst 
earnings (EPS) forecasts, and error of quarterly analyst earnings (EPS) forecasts computed as the 
absolute difference between actual and forecasted quarterly earnings (EPS), as proxies for 
information uncertainty.  Data on the bid-ask spread and trading volume – the daily number of 
shares of stock traded, are obtained from the CRSP database, and earnings (EPS), from the 
Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database each quarter.  These datasets are merged together with debt 
issues by firm ID.  The merger of data from FR Y-9C, CRSP, and IBES results in 115 unique 
banks. 
  Further, this study examines equity market reactions to the issue of new debt by firms.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that information asymmetry between insiders and outside 
investors make external financing by firms costly.  Using a probability of information-based 
trading (PIN) measure from a sequential trading model for stocks, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 
(2002) show that information risk is a determinant of asset returns.  Jones, Lee, and Yeager 
(2009, 2010) find that after controlling profitability, banks with more opaque investments have 
higher costs of capital, and opaque banks, which benefited the most from merger induced intra-
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industry revaluations in the pre-crisis period, also lost the most in the post-crisis period. 
  Similarly, Livingston and Zhou (2010) find that investors require an information 
uncertainty yield premium for split-rated bonds, and Liu and Moore (1987), that the magnitude 
of the bond price reaction to a split rating is greater for lower rated debt. Lastly, Peristiani, 
Morgan, and Savino (2010) show that equity markets largely deciphered on its own which banks 
would encounter difficulties in financing long before the stress test results were revealed, and 
banks with larger capital gaps experienced more negative abnormal returns.   
  Because the issue of dual rated new debt is widely known both to rating agencies and 
potential investors prior to issue date, a 62-day window (-60,+1) starting 60 days before issue 
date and one day post issue data is used to compute an annualized cumulative abnormal return as 
the difference the daily and CRSP equal-weighted index returns.  An annualized standard 
deviation of daily returns over the same event window is also calculated.2 
  Table 3 reports summary statistics for the above variables.  Bid-ask spread and trading 
volume of banks and nonbanks are similar.  Banks have the largest number of analysts with 
average of 15, and together with insurance companies, the highest analyst forecast errors among 
industries.   
 B.4 Information Uncertainty of Banks 
  Morgan (2002) contends that the information uncertainty of banks is inevitable because of 
the unique nature of bank assets (loans and trading assets in particular)in conjunction with high 
leverage, and Gorton (2010),that the asset complexities of MBS activities worsen information 
asymmetry.  Our sample of banks consists of publicly traded U.S. bank or financial holding 
companies (BHCs) that had the requisite market and financial statement data over the sample 
                                                 
2Various event windows of (0,0), (-1,+1), (-15,+1), and (-30,+1) and value-weighted CRSP 
index return were also used.  Results are similar. 
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period 1991-2010.  In addition to the financial crisis in 2008, the sample period covers three 
major deregulatory events – the demise of “too big to fail” after 1986, the Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1998.3,4 
  We refer to bank entities either as “banks” or “BHCs”.  Consolidated financial statement 
data for BHCs’ are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board FR Y-9C reports.  A bank with 
missing or unavailable data was excluded for that quarter, resulting in a sample of 3,464 bank-
quarter observations and 124 unique banks.5 
  Bank assets are classified into seven major categories as in Morgan (2002).6  Cash and 
federal funds, as well as premises and intangibles, have the least valuation uncertainty and are 
relatively more transparent than loans and trading assets.  Premises and Intangible Assets, which 
are relatively small proportions of bank assets, represent tangible fixed assets and goodwill and 
other nonmonetary intangible assets, respectively.7  
Loans, as well as securities and trading assets, are the primary sources of opacity.  Loans include 
commercial real estate loans, residential real estate loans, and all other loans.  Other opaque 
assets consists of: (i) mortgage-backed securities, including those not guaranteed by GNMA and 
those not issued by FNMA and FHLMC; and (ii) asset-backed securities, which includes credit  
                                                 
3The interstate restrictions of the Bank Holding Company act were repealed by the Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994, which allowed interstate mergers between 
adequately capitalized and managed banks, subject to concentration limits, state laws, and 
Community Reinvestment Act. 
4Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act enacted November 1999, repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 
1933, which allowed commercial and investment banks to consolidate.  Nobel Prize-winning 
economists Paul Krugman called Senator Phil Gramm "the father of the financial crisis" because 
of his sponsorship of the Act, and Joseph Stiglitz, that the Act helped to create the crisis.   
5There are 121 unique banks after merging banking financial data with IBES dataset and 115 
banks after merging bank financial data with CRSP dataset for stock return values. 
6Morgan (2002) divides bank assets into cash, federal funds, loans, trading assets, premises, 
intangibles, and other assets.   
7For example, mortgage servicing assets, purchased credit card relationships and nonmortgage 
servicing assets, and other identifiable intangible assets  
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Table 3:  Market Proxies of Information Uncertainty 
 
Table provides summary statistics for market proxies of information uncertainty. Numbers of 
analysts are the total numbers that cover a stock. Standard deviations of EPS forecasts are 
dispersions of quarterly earnings forecast. Absolute error of EPS forecasts is the absolute 
difference between actual and forecasted quarterly EPS. BAS/PRC is the bid-ask spread divided 
by price. Trading volume is the daily number of equity shares traded in millions. Holding Period 
Returns are annualized cumulative abnormal returns around a 62-day window (-60,+1) computed 
as the difference between daily and CRSP equal-weighted index returns, and annualized standard 
deviation, computed from daily returns (-60,+1). 
 
 
Number of 
Unique Firms Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of Analysts       
Banks 121 15.011 11 15 19 5.883 
Manufacturing         607 9.994 6 10 13 5.427 
Mining            163 10.817 5 9 16 7.363 
Trade  165 11.959 6 13 17 6.523 
Services 237 10.428 4 9 16 6.950 
Transportation 53 8.941 6 8 13 4.367 
Public Utilities 303 6.398 2 4 9 5.969 
Insurance 110 9.918 5 11 15 5.839 
Other Finance & Real Estate 158 8.093 4 7 12 5.075 
All Other 39 7.762 4 8 11 4.266 
Standard Deviation of Analyst EPS Forecasts     
Banks 121 0.042 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.064 
Manufacturing         607 0.042 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.088 
Mining            163 0.081 0.030 0.050 0.100 0.090 
Trade  165 0.027 0.010 0.010 0.030 0.043 
Services 237 0.025 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.030 
Transportation 53 0.081 0.020 0.030 0.070 0.129 
Public Utilities 303 0.153 0.020 0.030 0.060 3.168 
Insurance 110 0.310 0.010 0.020 0.060 1.543 
Other Finance & Real Estate 158 0.079 0.020 0.050 0.090 0.129 
All Other 39 0.049 0.010 0.030 0.060 0.061 
Absolute Error of Analyst EPS Forecasts     
Banks 121 0.346 0.010 0.040 0.120 0.376 
Manufacturing         607 0.164 0.010 0.040 0.120 0.424 
Mining            163 0.226 0.037 0.100 0.270 0.269 
Trade  165 0.099 0.010 0.030 0.080 0.206 
Services 237 0.059 0.010 0.030 0.075 0.123 
Transportation 53 0.153 0.020 0.060 0.140 0.383 
Public Utilities 303 0.018 0.007 0.023 0.023 6.139 
Insurance 110 4.282 0.020 0.070 0.290 2.584 
Other Finance & Real Estate 158 0.365 0.050 0.166 0.373 0.776 
All Other 39 0.214 0.020 0.068 0.185 0.175 
Bid-Ask Spread/Price    
Banks 115 0.023 0.016 0.020 0.026 0.011 
Manufacturing         597 0.025 0.017 0.022 0.030 0.013 
Mining            157 0.030 0.019 0.027 0.038 0.015 
Trade  169 0.024 0.017 0.022 0.028 0.011 
Services 243 0.027 0.018 0.023 0.033 0.016 
Transportation 53 0.024 0.017 0.022 0.029 0.012 
Public Utilities 290 0.024 0.013 0.019 0.028 0.021 
Insurance 72 0.021 0.014 0.018 0.024 0.011 
Other Finance & Real Estate 179 0.026 0.017 0.023 0.030 0.013 
All Other 41 0.032 0.024 0.029 0.037 0.014 
Trading Volume    
Banks 115 1.585 0.387 0.849 1.858 0.003 
Manufacturing         597 2.200 0.221 0.647 1.899 0.005 
Mining            157 1.521 0.161 0.505 1.510 0.003 
Trade  169 2.444 0.235 0.759 2.603 0.004 
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Services 243 2.297 0.090 0.400 1.423 0.007 
Transportation 53 0.860 0.179 0.400 0.897 0.001 
Public Utilities 290 1.402 0.076 0.226 0.847 0.004 
Insurance 72 4.685 0.076 0.422 2.136 0.032 
Other Finance & Real Estate 179 1.866 0.332 0.839 2.727 0.003 
All Other 41 0.661 0.085 0.291 0.926 0.001 
 
Number of 
Unique Firms Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Annualized Holding Period Returns Around Issue Date (-60,+1) 
Banks  115 -0.065 -1.027 -0.155 -0.155 1.835 
Manufacturing          597 -0.066 -1.162 -0.132 -0.132 2.469 
Mining             157 -0.002 -1.223 -0.037 -0.037 2.490 
Trade   169 -0.129 -1.152 -0.197 -0.197 2.115 
Services  243 0.121 -0.995 0.007 0.007 2.236 
Transportation  53 -0.089 -1.093 -0.309 -0.309 1.957 
Public Utilities  290 -0.063 -1.144 -0.195 -0.195 2.270 
Insurance  102 -0.048 -1.100 -0.026 -0.026 1.980 
Other Finance & Real Estate  179 0.054 -0.975 -0.059 -0.059 2.003 
All Other 41  0.374 -0.911 0.274 0.274 2.101 
Standard Deviation of Daily Returns Prior to Issue Date   
Banks  115 0.296 0.209 0.267 0.267 0.145 
Manufacturing          597 0.332 0.218 0.282 0.282 0.181 
Mining             157 0.391 0.252 0.336 0.336 0.205 
Trade   169 0.320 0.228 0.280 0.280 0.159 
Services  243 0.372 0.238 0.320 0.320 0.204 
Transportation  53 0.323 0.237 0.297 0.297 0.130 
Public Utilities  290 0.308 0.158 0.224 0.224 0.293 
Insurance  102 0.286 0.184 0.258 0.258 0.164 
Other Finance & Real Estate  179 0.342 0.224 0.306 0.306 0.172 
All Other 41  0.435 0.316 0.379 0.379 0.193 
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card receivables, home equity lines, automobile loans, other consumer loans, commercial and 
industrial loans.  Securities are financial assets purchased for the long term that are either held-
to-maturity or available-for-sale.  Financial securities held-to-maturity is reported at amortized 
cost and no adjustments are made for transitory fluctuations in fair value of these securities.  
Available-for-sale securities are reported at fair value and changes in fair value are not accounted 
as changes in net income but charged or credited directly to equity.  In contrast, trading assets, 
which are concentrated primarily in large banks, are debt and equity securities bought and sold in 
the near term.  Like securities, trading assets are also reported at fair value, but changes in fair 
value are recorded as changes in net income.  
  Lastly, total assets and square of total assets, which proxy for bank size, are inflation-
adjusted using the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI).  Capital, which proxies for bank equity, 
is computed as the ratio of total equity to risk-weighted total assets using the method specified 
under the 1989 Basel Accord for determining minimum bank capital requirements.8 
  Table 4 reports the bank holding company assets prior to new bond issuance.  Statistics are 
calculated for 3,464 bank observations over 80 quarters for new bond issues.  With a mean value 
of $207.11 million, loans represent almost half of bank’s total assets.  Trading assets and 
securities, cash, intangible assets, and federal funds make up the remaining of bank assets.  Fixed 
assets, by contrast, make up less than one percent of assets.  Trading assets have a wide range of 
                                                 
8The U.S. adopted the capital requirement standards established by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland in 1989.  Minimum capital is specified as a percentage 
of the risk-weighted assets of the bank.  The weight is zero for U.S. Treasury securities and 
mortgage-backed securities directly guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae); 20 percent for general obligation municipal bonds and mortgage- 
backed securities guaranteed by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac); 50 percent for municipal revenue 
bonds and privately issued mortgage-backed securities; and 100 percent in business and 
consumer loans.  Total capital must be at least 8% of total risk-weighted assets.  
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values ranging from 1,699 to 63,416.  Capital ratios improved over the last two decades because 
of compliance with the Basel Accord.  The average risk weighted capital ratio is 9.19%and the 
median is 8.82%. 
C. Empirical Results  
C.1 Information Uncertainty across Industries 
  Morgan (2002) finds that banks are relatively more opaque than other industries sectors 
during 1983 to 1993.  Using market microstructure variables from 1990-1997 as proxies for 
opacity, Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) find, however, that banks are not significantly 
opaque, just boring.  To examine whether banking industries are more opaque than all other 
industries, we run logit and probit regressions of rating disagreements on issuer type controlling 
for issue characteristics.  A rating split dummy variable and absolute rating gaps are used as 
substitutes for rating disagreement.  Logit and ordered probit egression results are reported in 
Table 5.  Issuer type is a dummy variable.  Issue characteristics are average rating, maturity, face 
value, and standard deviation of rating gap.  
  Results in Table 5 confirm Morgan (2002).  The likelihood of a rating split is higher, and 
the magnitude of the absolute rating gap is larger, for banks than non-banks.  Rating 
disagreements are more significant: (i) the lower is the quality of rated debt; (ii) the longer is 
debt maturity; (iii) the larger is the issue size which is associated with firm size; and (iv) the 
larger is the standard deviation in rating gap.9  Coefficients on industry dummies show that 
except for insurance companies, which are closely related to banks, information uncertainty is 
relatively similar across the remaining industries.  Further, observe that for banks, participation  
                                                 
9The coefficient estimates can be interpreted as how a small change in the continuous variables 
may result into the change in the probability of a split rating.  For example, from column (1) of 
Table 5, increase in the rating increases the changes of disagreement by 6.4%.  
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Table 4:  Bank Asset Composition and Capital 
 
Summary statistics cover 3,464 new bonds issued by publicly traded banks or bank holding 
companies reported in the SDC database in the 80 quarters spanned by the period 1991 through 
2010. Bank asset composition and capital are obtained from the Federal Reserve Y9-C Bank 
Holding Company Call Reports. Values are expressed in millions of dollars except for 
percentages. aSecurities purchased are either held-to-maturity or available for sale. bTrading 
assets are debt and equity securities bought and sold principally in the near term cRisk-weighted 
capital ratios are computed as quarterly average equity divided by risk-weighted assets. Weights 
are defined by risk-sensitivity ratios under the 1989 Basel Accord. Definitions of asset 
composition and capital are detailed in Appendix C.  
 
  Mean 
% of 
Total 
Assets 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cash 20,170 4.70% 2.09% 5.78% 12.14% 4.74% 
Federal Funds and Repurchases 9,644 2.25% 0.13% 1.50% 4.78% 3.32% 
Securitiesa 53,161 12.39% 4.90% 11.23% 29.47% 12.62% 
Trading Assetsb 65,116 15.18% 0.74% 7.23% 27.58% 21.89% 
Total Loans 207,110 48.27% 21.34% 58.89% 146.78% 40.47% 
      Residential Real Estate Loans 65,879 15.35% 4.93% 16.39% 45.83% 15.67% 
      Commercial Real Estate Loans 17,552 4.09% 2.08% 5.75% 9.32% 3.45% 
      Other Loans 123,678 28.83% 14.21% 35.40% 69.64% 24.19% 
Premises 3,770 0.88% 0.49% 1.42% 2.77% 0.57% 
Intangible Assets 12,186 2.84% 0.21% 0.98% 5.40% 3.99% 
Other Assets 57,906 13.50% 1.88% 4.49% 15.56% 21.15% 
Total Assets 429,062 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Risk-weighted Capitalc 9.19% 9.19% 7.84% 8.82% 10.56% 2.12% 
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Table 5:  Rating Agency Disagreements, Bond Characteristics, and Issuer Type 
 
Columns (1)-(4) report coefficient estimates from logit regressions of the probability of split 
rating changes, and columns (5)-(8), ordered probit regressions of the absolute ratings gap. All 
regressions include unreported year dummies for all years except the crisis year 2008. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. aSPLIT = 0 if Moody’s = S&P, and 1 if Moody’s ≠ S&P. 
bAbsolute gap =|Moody’s – S&P| cAverage of Moody’s and S&P ratings; higher values indicate 
higher risk. dBank*MBS refers to banks that issued mortgage-backed securities during the 
sample period. *. **. *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. SIC codes used to classify industries are detailed in Appendix B.  
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SPLITa |Moody’s – S&P|b 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
        
Issue Characteristics          
Average Ratingc 0.064*** (0.002) 
0.064*** 
(0.002) 
0.051*** 
(0.003) 
0.053*** 
(0.003) 
0.056*** 
(0.002) 
 0.057*** 
(0.002) 
0.046*** 
(0.002) 
0.047*** 
(0.003 ) 
Maturity (years) 0.012*** (0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
       Face Value 
($10M) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Standard Deviation  
       of Rating Gap     
0.107*** 
(0.014)    
0.124*** 
(0.012) 
Issuer Type         
Bank 0.828*** (0.023) 
0.708*** 
(0.032)   
0.793*** 
(0.020) 
0.591*** 
(0.028)   
      Bank × MBS Issued  0.229*** (0.042)    
0.377*** 
(0.036)   
Other          
Manufacturing            -0.680*** (0.031) 
-0.681*** 
(0.031)   
-0.684*** 
(0.027) 
-0.686*** 
(0.028) 
Mining               -0.790*** (0.053) 
-0.770*** 
(0.056)   
-0.766*** 
(0.048) 
-0.747*** 
(0.050) 
Trade     -0.563*** (0.045) 
-0.566*** 
(0.047)   
-0.598*** 
(0.040) 
-0.611*** 
(0.042) 
Services    -0.688*** (0.043) 
-0.677*** 
(0.044)   
-0.718*** 
(0.038) 
-0.716*** 
(0.040) 
      Transportation    -0.693*** (0.062) 
-0.804*** 
(0.064)   
-0.607*** 
(0.055) 
-0.720*** 
(0.057) 
Public Utilities    -0.630*** (0.034) 
-0.663*** 
(0.035)   
-0.621*** 
(0.030) 
-0.651*** 
(0.031) 
Insurance    -0.500*** (0.053) 
-0.547*** 
(0.055)   
-0.421*** 
(0.047) 
-0.464*** 
(0.049) 
Other Finance and  
Real Estate    
-0.954*** 
(0.025) 
-0.924*** 
(0.026)   
-0.907*** 
(0.022) 
-0.874*** 
(0.023) 
All Other    -1.047*** (0.083) 
-1.101*** 
(0.085)   
-0.987*** 
(0.077) 
-1.027*** 
(0.079) 
         
         
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.119 0.129 0.136 0.101 0.106 0.110 0.118 
Number of 
Observations 25,652 25,652 25,652 24,739 25,652 25,652 25,652 24,739 
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in mortgage-backed asset securitization activities increased asset complexity and opacity.  
Coefficients for bank and bank interacted with mortgage-backed securitization are positive and 
statistically significant.   
C.2 Information Uncertainty of Banks 
  But why are banks opaque?  Morgan (2002) argues that banks are inherently opaque 
because of the unique nature of bank assets and its use of leverage.  Logit and ordered probit 
regressions reported in Table 6 examine the impact of asset composition and capital, as well as 
participation in mortgage-backed asset securitization activities, on the likelihood of a rating split 
and the magnitude of the absolute rating gap. Other assets10, which are used as the benchmark, 
are excluded in the regressions. 
  The Chi-square test that the asset composition coefficients are jointly zero confirms that 
bank assets influence the likelihood and magnitude of rating disagreements.  As expected, the 
coefficients on securities and trading assets, as well as total loans are significantly positive, and 
significantly negative, on premises and intangible assets.  The significant positive coefficient 
sign on cash and federal funds, which are presumably more transparent, is consistent with the 
agency costs of high free cash flow (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Further, ratings disagreements 
are more significant: (i) the lower is the quality of rated debt; (ii) the longer is the debt maturity; 
and (iii) the larger is the issue size which is associated with firm size.   
  Contrary to Morgan (2002), however, the coefficient on capital is significantly positive.  
The explanation is twofold.  The first is the difference in sample period.  Banks were not actively 
involved in asset securitization and complex derivatives during Morgan’s (2002) sample period 
1983-1993.  Second, as Iannotta (2006) notes, bank capital may proxy for omitted sources of  
                                                 
10 Other assets are total assets minus loan, securities, trading assets, cash, federal funds, 
premises and intangibles, scaled by total assets. 
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Tables 6A and 6B:  Bank Holding Company Assets and Rating Agency Disagreements 
 
Table reports ordered probit and multinomial logit with fixed effects regressions of the absolute 
difference between Moody’s and S&P ratings of new bond issues against bank asset composition 
and capital.  Bank asset composition and capital variables are expressed as percentages of total 
assets.  Risk-Weighted Capital ratios computed as quarterly average equity divided by risk-
weighted asset. Weights are defined by risk-sensitivity ratios under the Basel Accord.  Total 
assets are in billions of dollars.  *. **. *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
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 Absolute Ratings Gap:  |Moody’s – S&P| 
Table 6A Ordered Probit 
 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald  
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald  
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq  
 
        
Assets         
Cash and Federal 
Funds 
2.733*** 0.784 12.159 0.001 2.639*** 0.796 10.977 0.001 
Securities & 
Trading Assets 
1.352* 0.773 3.057 0.080 1.448* 0.804 3.240 0.072 
Total Loans 2.799*** 0.648 18.632 <.0001 2.56*** 0.667 14.737 0.000 
Premises and 
Intangibles 
-2.272 2.474 0.844 0.358 -0.799 2.605 0.094 0.759 
Risk-Weighted 
Capital 
-2.872 1.931 2.213 0.137 4.743** 2.321 4.178 0.041 
Total Assets 1.628*** 0.169 92.689 <.0001 1.783*** 0.190 88.569 <.0001 
Square Total 
Assets 
-0.419*** 0.076 30.355 <.0001 -0.416*** 0.081 26.131 <.0001 
         
MBS     1.219*** 0.209 34.166 <.0001 
MBS*Risk-
Weighted Capital     -14.009*** 2.377 34.749 <.0001 
         
Bond 
Characteristics         
Average Rating -0.035* 0.018 3.738 0.053 -0.025 0.018 1.894 0.169 
Maturity, years 0.008** 0.003 5.519 0.019 0.009** 0.003 6.184 0.013 
Face Value ($10 
mil) -0.001*** 0.000 7.612 0.006 -0.001** 0.000 6.378 
0.012 
 
Year Dummies 
(excluding 2008) 
        
        
        
1991 1.722*** 0.246 48.865 <.0001 1.827*** 0.249 54.029 <.0001 
1992 1.335*** 0.228 34.396 <.0001 1.475*** 0.231 40.940 <.0001 
1993 1.339*** 0.216 38.537 <.0001 1.540*** 0.220 49.090 <.0001 
1994 0.639*** 0.212 9.080 0.003 0.816*** 0.216 14.300 0.000 
1995 0.235 0.209 1.265 0.261 0.430*** 0.213 4.088 0.043 
1996 0.113 0.206 0.302 0.582 0.284 0.210 1.833 0.176 
1997 0.272 0.202 1.816 0.178 0.377* 0.204 3.407 0.065 
1998 1.101*** 0.197 31.207 <.0001 1.196*** 0.199 36.042 <.0001 
1999 1.135*** 0.198 32.860 <.0001 1.269*** 0.201 39.945 <.0001 
2000 1.490*** 0.197 57.275 <.0001 1.612*** 0.200 65.289 <.0001 
2001 1.425*** 0.199 51.526 <.0001 1.540*** 0.201 58.620 <.0001 
2002 1.793*** 0.205 76.506 <.0001 1.880*** 0.207 82.455 <.0001 
2003 1.794*** 0.204 77.439 <.0001 1.864*** 0.206 82.025 <.0001 
2004 1.787*** 0.199 80.946 <.0001 1.884*** 0.201 88.067 <.0001 
2005 1.652*** 0.198 69.928 <.0001 1.729*** 0.200 75.092 <.0001 
2006 1.368*** 0.191 51.465 <.0001 1.433*** 0.192 55.494 <.0001 
2007 0.804*** 0.183 19.299 <.0001 0.812*** 0.184 19.528 <.0001 
2009 0.574 0.265 4.702 0.030 0.571** 0.264 4.677 0.031 
2010 0.730*** 0.262 7.735 0.005 0.791*** 0.264 9.007 0.003 
Pseudo R2 0.301    0.310    
Joint Significance  0.000    0.000    
Number of Obs. 
Observations 3,464    3,464    
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 Absolute Ratings Gap:  |Moody’s – S&P| 
 
Logit(with fixed effects) 
Table 6B 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald  
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald  
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq  
 
        
Assets         
Cash and Federal 
Funds 
1.949*** 0.510 3.820 0.000 1.894*** 0.518 3.660 0.000 
Securities & Trading 
Assets 
0.943* 0.504 1.870 0.061 0.978* 0.524 1.870 0.062 
Total Loans 1.978*** 0.422 4.690 <.0001 1.775*** 0.434 4.090 <.0001 
Premises and 
Intangibles 
-2.073 1.626 -1.270 0.203 -0.850 1.691 -0.500 0.615 
Risk-Weighted Capital -1.469 1.249 -1.180 0.240 4.304*** 1.500 2.870 0.004 
Total Assets 1.209*** 0.112 10.840 <.0001 1.312*** 0.122 10.750 <.0001 
Square Total Assets -0.327*** 0.051 -6.450 <.0001 -0.320*** 0.053 -5.990 <.0001 
          
MBS      0.939*** 0.135 6.950 <.0001 
MBS×Risk-Weighted 
Capital       -10.736*** 1.532 -7.010 <.0001 
          
Bond Characteristics          
Average Rating -0.022* 0.012 -1.840 0.066 -0.014 0.012 -1.150 0.251 
Maturity (years) 0.004* 0.002 1.640 0.101 0.004* 0.002 1.800 0.073 
Face Value ($10M) -0.001*** 0.000 -3.080 0.002 -0.001** 0.000 -2.760 0.006 
Year Dummies 
(excluding 2008) 
         
        
         
1991 1.238*** 0.159 7.800 <.0001 1.304*** 0.158 8.250 <.0001 
1992 0.851*** 0.145 5.870 <.0001 0.947*** 0.145 6.540 <.0001 
1993 0.935*** 0.137 6.850 <.0001 1.077*** 0.137 7.850 <.0001 
1994 0.408*** 0.133 3.070 0.002 0.535*** 0.133 4.020 <.0001 
1995 0.194 0.129 1.500 0.133 0.340*** 0.130 2.610 0.009 
1996 0.128 0.127 1.010 0.312 0.256** 0.127 2.020 0.044 
1997 0.198 0.124 1.590 0.111 0.272** 0.124 2.190 0.029 
1998 0.690*** 0.123 5.620 <.0001 0.757*** 0.122 6.180 <.0001 
1999 0.693*** 0.124 5.610 <.0001 0.789*** 0.123 6.390 <.0001 
2000 0.963*** 0.123 7.840 <.0001 1.047*** 0.123 8.550 <.0001 
2001 0.902*** 0.124 7.270 <.0001 0.983*** 0.124 7.940 <.0001 
2002 1.183*** 0.129 9.190 <.0001 1.243*** 0.128 9.700 <.0001 
2003 1.171*** 0.128 9.160 <.0001 1.218*** 0.127 9.570 <.0001 
2004 1.148*** 0.125 9.220 <.0001 1.216*** 0.124 9.800 <.0001 
2005 1.052*** 0.124 8.470 <.0001 1.106*** 0.124 8.940 <.0001 
2006 0.856*** 0.120 7.140 <.0001 0.902*** 0.119 7.550 <.0001 
2007 0.483*** 0.115 4.200 <.0001 0.488*** 0.114 4.280 <.0001 
2009 0.341** 0.168 2.030 0.042 0.327** 0.167 1.960 0.051 
2010 0.433*** 0.169 2.570 0.010 0.500*** 0.168 2.980 0.003 
Pseudo R2  0.263    0.273    
Joint Significance ssets 0.000    0.000    
Number of 
Observations 3,464    3,464    
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opacity.  That is, a higher level of risk-weighted capital compensates for lower asset quality not 
captured in asset composition. 
  This conjecture is confirmed in the second column of Table 6A where risk-weighted capital 
is interacted with a mortgage-backed asset securitization dummy variable. Results show that 
rating splits banks are more likely for banks involved with mortgage-backed asset securitization, 
but high risk-weighted capital mitigates the likelihood of a rating split.  In other words, rating 
disagreements increase with the asset complexity but information uncertainty concomitant with 
complexity can be offset by maintaining higher risk-weighted capital. 
  Lastly, coefficients on year dummies show that deregulation events, which are associated 
with the demise of “too big to fail” after 1986, the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1998, increased the likelihood and magnitude 
of split ratings.  The increase in competition from deregulation reduces bank profitability, and 
the resulting adverse impact on market equity, diminishes the regulatory threat of an operating 
charter loss on the risk exposure and capital adequacy of banks (Keely, 1990).Assuming that 
only the highest quality debt could be issued in the 2008 crisis year, the large decline in year 
dummy coefficients pre-2008, and small rise post-2008, suggests that the quality of bank debt 
issues improved in the years leading up to the financial crisis and remained relatively high after 
the financial crisis. 
  Table 7, which divides banks into two subgroups by the median risk-weighted capital ratio, 
examines the impact of mortgage-backed asset securitization activities on rating disagreement 
controlling for issue characteristics, firm size, and year dummies.  Two observations can be 
made.  First, for poorly capitalized banks, loans and trading  
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Table 7:  Impact of Bank Capital on Information Uncertainty 
 
Table reports ordered probit regressions of the absolute difference between Moody’s and S&P 
ratings of new bond issues for banks below and above the median capital ratio across banks each 
year. Bank asset composition and capital are expressed as percentages of total assets. Total assets 
are in billions of dollars. *. **. *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 Risk-Weighted Capital < Median Risk-Weighted Capital >Median 
 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald  
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald  
Chi-
Square Pr>ChiSq  
 
        
Assets         
Cash and Federal Funds 7.778*** 1.323 34.568 <.0001 1.244 1.347 0.852 0.356 
Securities & Trading 
Assets 6.304*** 1.404 20.168 <.0001 1.388 1.258 1.218 0.270 
Total Loans 8.353*** 1.190 49.235 <.0001 0.637 1.034 0.380 0.538 
Premises and 
Intangibles -14.277*** 5.308 7.233 0.007 0.859 3.757 0.052 0.819 
Risk-Weighted Capital 14.71*** 4.801 9.387 0.002 2.408 3.176 0.575 0.448 
Total Assets 2.749*** 0.375 53.754 <.0001 1.904*** 0.272 48.878 <.0001 
Square Total Assets -0.668*** 0.138 23.403 <.0001 -0.730*** 0.144 25.664 <.0001 
          
MBS 1.198*** 0.370 10.491 0.001 1.069*** 0.306 12.173 0.001 
MBS*Risk-Weighted 
Capital -15.362*** 4.769 10.378 0.001 -13.024*** 3.297 15.603 <.0001 
          
Bond Characteristics          
Average Rating -0.122*** 0.031 15.766 <.0001 0.030 0.024 1.522 0.217 
Maturity (years) 0.013*** 0.005 7.053 0.008 0.007 0.005 1.922 0.166 
Face Value ($10M) -0.001** 0.001 4.091 0.043 0.000 0.001 0.337 0.561 
Year Dummies 
(excluding 2008) 
         
         
        
1991 3.429*** 0.407 71.028 <.0001 0.538* 0.336 2.562 0.110 
1992 2.428*** 0.375 41.887 <.0001 0.671** 0.307 4.781 0.029 
1993 2.567*** 0.362 50.430 <.0001 0.334 0.294 1.288 0.256 
1994 0.979*** 0.354 7.665 0.006 0.433 0.285 2.310 0.129 
1995 0.496 0.356 1.946 0.163 0.087 0.277 0.097 0.755 
1996 -0.066 0.342 0.037 0.848 0.158 0.275 0.330 0.566 
1997 0.469 0.340 1.906 0.167 -0.258 0.267 0.933 0.334 
1998 1.151*** 0.330 12.144 0.001 0.833*** 0.259 10.306 0.001 
1999 1.453*** 0.322 20.379 <.0001 0.778*** 0.266 8.532 0.004 
2000 1.631*** 0.324 25.374 <.0001 1.216*** 0.262 21.463 <.0001 
2001 1.368*** 0.324 17.865 <.0001 1.335*** 0.264 25.504 <.0001 
2002 2.038*** 0.335 37.092 <.0001 1.673*** 0.270 38.408 <.0001 
2003 2.062*** 0.332 38.618 <.0001 1.628*** 0.271 36.194 <.0001 
2004 2.062*** 0.317 42.242 <.0001 1.618*** 0.264 37.677 <.0001 
2005 2.110*** 0.311 46.184 <.0001 1.123*** 0.265 17.946 <.0001 
2006 1.929*** 0.294 43.126 <.0001 0.877*** 0.257 11.655 0.001 
2007 1.130*** 0.269 17.702 <.0001 0.485** 0.253 3.670 0.055 
2009 0.976** 0.412 5.610 0.018 0.135 0.368 0.134 0.714 
2010 1.059*** 0.408 6.736 0.009 0.575 0.362 2.527 0.112 
Pseudo R2 0.417    0.303    
Joint Significance 0.000    0.000    
Number of Obs   1,698       1,766    
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securities increase the likelihood of rating split, but not for well-capitalized banks.  Moreover, 
for poorly capitalized banks, premise and intangible asset significantly reduce ratings 
disagreement, but is not significant for well-capitalized banks.  Second, for poorly and well 
capitalized bank groups, the coefficients on the mortgage-backed asset securitization dummy 
variable and its interaction with risk-weighted capital are significantly positive and negative 
respectively.  Again, rating disagreements increase with the asset complexity but information 
uncertainty concomitant with complexity can be offset by higher risk-weighted capital holdings.  
The magnitude of coefficients also suggests that the importance of asset complexity and risk-
weighted capital are greater for poorly capitalized banks.  
C.3 Information Uncertainty and Market Microstructure 
  Table 8 reports logit and ordered probit regressions of the likelihood of a split rating and 
absolute ratings gap on variables that are market proxies for information uncertainty.  In contrast 
to Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004), the results show that ratings disagreements reflect 
market proxies of information uncertainty.   
  Ratings disagreements are more significant: (i) the higher is the bid-ask spread; (ii) the 
lower is trading volume which is associated with poor liquidity and less informed trading; and 
(iii) when the standard deviation and absolute error of analyst earnings (EPS) forecasts are high.  
The use of the number of analysts as a stand-alone proxy for information uncertainty exposes a 
potential endogeneity problem.  Higher analyst coverage mitigates information asymmetry 
(Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Livingston, Naranjo, and Zhou, 2007) but opacity also 
creates a higher investor demand for information and analyst coverage.   Controlling for the bid-
ask spread,   higher analyst coverage reduces the adverse selection costs to market makers of 
trading against informed investors. 
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Table 8:  Rating Agency Disagreements and Market Proxies of Information Uncertainty 
 
Columns (1)-(4) report coefficient estimates from logit regressions of split rating changes, and 
columns (5)-(8), ordered probit regressions of the absolute ratings gap, against proxies of 
security analyst and investor uncertainty. All regressions include unreported year dummies for 
all years except the crisis year 2008. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. aSPLIT = 0 if 
Moody’s = S&P, and 1 if Moody’s ≠ S&P. bAbsolute gap =|Moody’s – S&P|. cAverage of 
Moody’s and S&P ratings; higher values indicate higher risk. *. **. *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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 SPLITa |Moody’s – S&P|b 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
 Market Proxies         
       Number of Analysts 0.005*** (0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
  (0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.002) 
       Standard Deviation of 
           Annual EPS Forecasts 
0.047*** 
(0.017) 
0.025*** 
(0.017) 
0.090*** 
(0.017) 
0.074*** 
(0.017) 
0.123*** 
(0.015) 
0.101*** 
(0.015) 
0.150*** 
  (0.015) 
0.133*** 
(0.015) 
       Absolute Error of 
           Quarterly EPS Forecasts 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
0.018* 
(0.003) 
0.037*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
0.035*** 
(0.004) 
0.026* 
(0.004) 
0.043*** 
(0.005) 
0.035*** 
(0.004) 
       Bid-Ask Spread/Price 
 1.001*** 
 (0.465) 
 2.746*** 
(0.467) 
 2.472*** 
  (0.419) 
 3.746*** 
  (0.421)
 
       Trading Volume 
 
-2.954*** 
  (0.000) 
 
-2.971*** 
(0.804) 
 
-1.333*** 
  (0.635) 
 -1.601*** 
  (0.647)
 
Issue Characteristics          
       Average Ratingc 0.013*** (0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.002*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002)
 
       Maturity (years) 0.009*** (0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
       Face Value ($10M) 0.001*** (0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
       Standard Deviation of Rating Gap 0.058*** 
  (0.006) 
0.047*** 
  (0.007) 
0.047*** 
  (0.006) 
0.013 
(0.007) 
0.100*** 
  (0.005) 
 
0.058*** 
  (0.006) 
0.082*** 
(0.006) 
0.023 
(0.007) 
Issuer Type         
       Bank 0.728*** (0.015) 
0.413*** 
(0.014)   
0.592*** 
(0.013) 
0.386*** 
(0.013)   
             Bank × MBS Issue 0.113*** (0.018) 
0.654*** 
(0.023)   
0.321*** 
(0.015) 
0.456*** 
(0.020)   
       Manufacturing            -0.793*** (0.013) 
-0.466*** 
(0.016)   
-0.792*** 
(0.011) 
-0.426*** 
(0.014) 
       Mining               -0.684*** (0.024) 
-0.463*** 
(0.027)   
-0.669*** 
(0.022) 
-0.445*** 
(0.025) 
       Trade     -0.671*** (0.019) 
-0.411*** 
(0.022)   
-0.663*** 
(0.017) 
-0.337*** 
(0.020) 
       Services    -0.604*** (0.019) 
-0.329*** 
(0.022)   
-0.671*** 
(0.017) 
-0.354*** 
(0.020) 
       Transportation    -0.904*** (0.024) 
-0.502*** 
(0.028)   
-0.799*** 
(0.022) 
-0.387*** 
(0.025) 
       Insurance    -0.530*** (0.017) 
-0.131*** 
(0.021)   
-0.591*** 
(0.015) 
-0.184*** 
(0.018) 
       Public Utilities   -0.884*** (0.022) 
-0.631*** 
(0.028)   
-0.769*** 
(0.020) 
-0.485*** 
(0.026) 
       Other Finance and Real Estate    -0.932** (0.015) 
-0.423 
(0.018)   
-0.925*** 
(0.013) 
-0.410*** 
(0.016) 
       All Other    -1.109*** (0.036) 
-0.778*** 
(0.038)   
-1.061*** 
(0.034) 
-1.708*** 
(0.036) 
         
         Pseudo R2 0.569 0.308 0.602 0.291 0.695 0.297 0.699 0.286 
Number of Observations 10,111 7,983 10,111 7,983 10,111 7,983 10,111 7,983 
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 C.4  Market Prices and Information Uncertainty 
  Table 9 examines the impact of rating split and industry on the equity market reaction to 
new debt issues, controlling for the volatility of equity returns, as well as, firm and issue 
characteristics.  The dependent variable in these regressions are the annualized abnormal holding 
period equity returns over the 62-day event window (-60, +1) around the issue date.  Columns 
(1)-(3) compare banks to nonbanks, and columns (4)-(6), nonbank firms in other industries 
against banks. 
  Overall, the results that informational asymmetries between insiders and outsiders make 
external financing costly.  In all regressions, intercepts verify that average equity market 
reactions to new debt issues, regardless of industry, are always significantly negative, and are 
more negative, the higher is the volatility of equity returns.  Moreover, that the coefficients on 
split rating are insignificant in regressions (2)-(3) which compare banks against nonbanks, but 
significant in regressions (5)-(6) which compare nonbanks against banks, confirm the results in 
Table 8 that rating disagreements imbed market proxies of information uncertainty.  Further, 
observe that the coefficient on banks in regression (1) and coefficients on the interaction of split 
rating and banks in regressions (2)-(3) are statistically significant.  Moreover, the coefficients on 
non-bank industries in regression (4) and coefficients on the interaction of split rating and non-
bank industries in regressions (5)-(6) are insignificant.  These results indicate that equity returns 
surrounding new debt issues by banks are notably lower.  Information uncertainty about banks is 
more significant. 
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Table 9:  Holding Period Returns and Rating Agency Disagreements 
 
Columns (1)-(6) report regressions of holding period returns against rating agency disagreements 
clustered by firm and with year dummies. Bank asset composition and capital are expressed as 
percentages of total assets. Total assets are in billions of dollars. aHolding Period Returns are 
annualized cumulative abnormal returns around a 62-day window (-60,+1) computed as the 
difference between daily and CRSP equal-weighted index returns, and annualized standard 
deviation, computed from daily returns (-60,+1). bIn regressions (3) and (6), split is computed as 
the inverse logistic transform of the residuals in a first-stage logistic regression of split against all 
other independent variables in the second-stage holding period returns regressions.  
 
 Holding Period Returnsa 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       Intercept -3.290*** (1.109) 
-2.580*** 
(0.905) 
-1.108** 
(0.597) 
-0.528* 
(0.388) 
-0.475*** 
(0.201) 
-0.094 
(0.247) 
       Standard Deviation -1.832 (1.889) 
-0.821 
(0.896) 
-1.801 
(1.282) 
1.173 
(0.513) 
-0.301* 
(0.194) 
1.441 
(0.525) 
Issue Characteristics       
       Average Rating 0.094 (0.053) 
0.094 
(0.053) 
0.158 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.024) 
0.054 
(0.011) 
0.058 
(0.012) 
       Maturity (years) 0.000 (0.014) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
       Face Value ($10M) -0.001 (0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Firm Characteristics       
       Total Assets 1.329 (1.486) 
1.684 
(1.370) 
0.661 
(0.613) 
0.009 
(0.027) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
       Capital Ratio 14.263** (5.733) 
13.536** 
(5.345) 
0.735 
(4.649) 
0.081 
(0.210) 
-0.063 
(0.180) 
0.005 
(0.196) 
Issuer Type       
       Bank -0.805* (0.351)      
           Bank × MBS -0.035 (0.288)      
       Manufacturing            0.044 (0.097)   
       Mining               -0.039 (0.163)   
       Trade     -0.148 (0.130) 
0.127 
  
       Services    0.127 (0.129)   
       Transportation    
-0.001 
(0.158) 
-0.001 
  
       Insurance    -0.010 (0.155)   
       Public Utilities    -0.093 (0.120)   
       Other Finance and Real Estate    0.184 (0.103)   
       All Other    0.282 (0.215)   
Market Proxies       
       Number of Analysts 0.025* (0.019) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.018) 
0.008* 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(0.018) 
       Standard Deviation of 
           Annual EPS Forecasts 
1.728 
(1.081)  
1.724 
(1.144) 
-0.122* 
(0.094) 
-0.160** 
(0.076) 
1.724 
(1.144) 
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       Absolute Error of 
           Quarterly EPS Forecasts 
-0.199* 
(0.114) 
-0.192* 
(0.122) 
-0.048* 
(0.166) 
-0.006* 
(0.017)  
-0.048* 
(0.166) 
       Bid-Ask Spread/Price 9.251 (27.304)  
5.347 
(28.121) 
-21.518*** 
(6.832) 
-43.377*** 
(6.368) 
5.347 
(28.121) 
       Trading Volume 45.416 (67.817)  
23.079 
(82.789) 
1.033 
(3.795)  
23.079 
(82.789) 
       
       
Rating Disagreement       
Splitb  -0.232 (0.194) 
0.002 
(0.017)  
-0.137* 
(0.103) 
-0.615 
(0.259) 
            Split × Bank  -0.986*** (0.347) 
-0.039* 
(0.188)    
                 Split × Bank × MBS  0.249 (0.341) 
0.341 
(0.502)    
            Split × Manufacturing      0.001 (0.123) 
0.041 
(0.183) 
            Split × Mining     0.233 (0.222) 
0.005 
0.017 
(0.320) 
0.005 
            Split ×Trade      (0.175) 
- 269
(0.250) 
            Split ×Services     -0.235 (0.172) 
0.081 
(0.245) 
            Split ×Transportation     -0.008 (0.225) 
-0.044 
(0.315) 
            Split × Insurance     -0.040 (0.235) 
-0.241 
(0.312) 
            Split × Public Utilities     -0.151 (0.150) 
-0.200 
(0.226) 
            Split × Other Finance  
            and Real Estate     
-0.001 
(0.148) 
0.157 
(0.207) 
            Split × All Other     0.043 (0.359) 
0.330 
(0.453) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.063 0.067 0.012 0.017 0.019 
Number of Observations 7,983 7,983 7,983 7,983 7,983 7,983 
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D. Conclusion 
  In this study, we use disagreements on dual-rated debt issues by firms to proxy for 
information uncertainty.  The 20-year sample period 1991-2010covers three major deregulatory 
events – the demise of “too big to fail” after 1986, the Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1998, as well as the years prior and 
subsequent to the financial crisis in 2008.  We validate Morgan’s (2002) finding that rating splits 
are more likely, and the magnitude of rating gaps are larger, for banks relative to nonbanks.  
Asset composition and capital are inherent sources of information uncertainty for banks.  Opacity 
is more severe for banks with higher loan and trading asset holdings and lower risk-weighted 
capital.   
  Additionally, we extend Morgan’s (2002) findings.  First, participation by banks in 
mortgage-backed asset securitization increases its complexity and opacity.  Second, the 
deregulation of the banking industry, which intensified competition and reduced the discipline of 
charter value, also contributed to increased information uncertainty.  Third, the large decline in 
the significance of rating disagreements pre-crisis and small rise post-crisis suggests that the 
quality of bank debt issues improved in the years leading up to 2008 and remained relatively 
high subsequently. 
  Importantly, we also show that rating disagreements reflect market proxies of information 
uncertainty.  In particular, information uncertainty is lower, when analyst coverage is higher, and 
the standard deviation and absolute error of analyst earnings forecasts are lower.  Low trading 
volume and high bid-ask spreads are associated with more significant rating disagreements.   
  Last but not least, markets price information uncertainty. Opacity increases the 
informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and makes external financing more 
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costly.  Equity returns surrounding new debt issues are significantly negative on average, and 
notably lower, for banks compared to nonbanks. Information uncertainty impedes market 
discipline and substantiates the need for regulation and supervision of banks to prevent excessive 
risk taking, enforce capital adequacy standards, and constrain activities that intensify systemic 
risks. 
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Appendix A:  Numerical vs. Letter Ratings 
 
Numerical Rating S&P Rating Moody’s Rating 
1 AAA Aaa 
2 AA+ Aa1 
3 AA Aa2 
4 AA- Aa3 
5 A+ A1 
6 A A2 
7 A- A3 
8 BBB+ Baa1 
9 BBB Baa2 
10 BBB- Baa3 
11 BB+ Ba1 
12 BB Ba2 
13 BB- Ba3 
14 B+ B1 
15 B B2 
16 B- B3 
17 CCC+ Caa1 
18 CCC Caa2 
19 CCC- Caa3 
20 CC Ca 
21 C C 
 
 
Appendix B: Industry Classification Standard 
 
Industrial Sector SIC Codes 
Bank 6021, 6022, 6029, 6712 or 6719 
Manufacturing 20-39 
Mining 10-14 
Transportation 41-47 
Trade 50-59 
Other Finance and Real Estate  
60 other than 6021, 6022, 6029, 6712, 6719,  
6311, 6321, 6324, 6331, 6351, 6361,6399, 
6411 
Services 70-89 
Public Utilities  40,48-49 
Insurance 6311, 6321, 6324, 6331, 6351, 6361,6399, 6411 
All Other 01-09, 15-17, 52 
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Appendix C:  Bank Capital and Asset Composition 
 
Variables from the FR Y-9C call reports used to describe bank asset composition and capital in 
this study are defined below.  Balance sheet items are the end of quarter values.  Unless 
otherwise specified, all variables are scaled by total assets.    
 
TA  Total inflation-adjusted assets BHCK2170 
CASH  Cash and Noninterest-bearing balances BHCK0081+BHCK0395+BHCK0397 
FF  Federal Funds and Repurchases BHCK0276+BHCK0277, or BHCK1350, or BHDMB987+BHCKB989 
RESREAL Residential real estate loans and leases, net BHDM1415+BHDM1420+BHDM1460+ BHDM1480  
COMREAL Commercial real estate loans and leases, net BHDM1797+BHDM5367+BHDM5368 
OTHLOAN All other loans, net BHCK2122∼REALLOAN  
 TL Total Loan RESREAL+COMREAL+OTHLOAN  
 PREM Premises BHCK2145 
 IA Intangible Assets BHCK3163+BHCK0426 
 SEC Held-to-maturity securities, available-for-sale 
securities 
BHCK1754, BHCK1773 
BHCK 0390 (prior to year 1993) 
 TRADE Trading Assets BHCK3545 
 OA 
All others except cash, federal funds, total loan, 
securities, trading assets, premises, and intangible 
assets 
 
1 –  (CASH+FF+TL+SEC+TRADE 
+PREM+IA)/ASSETS 
 CAP Equity capital 1– (BHCK2948/ASSETS)  
RWC Risk-weighted capital 
BHCK3519/BHCK3368 (year1991-1995) 
BHCK3519/BHCKA223 (year1996-2000) 
BHCK7205 (year2001-2010) 
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A. Introduction 
  Many analysts have blamed the dramatic collapse of the U.S. banking industry in 2007 and 
2008, at least in part, on aggressive corporate governance. 11   Academic research generally 
supports the hypothesis that aggressive corporate governance incentives leads to greater risk-
taking.  Laeven and Levine (2009), for example, find that banks with more powerful owners tend 
to take greater risks.  Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) find that banks receiving bailout 
funds had greater board independence than banks that did not receive bailout funds. Fortin, 
Goldberg and Roth (2010) find that BHCs with greater managerial control take less risk.  Pathan 
(2009) finds that bank boards that reflect bank shareholders’ interest increase bank risk-taking.  
In contrast, greater CEO power reduces bank risk-taking.  A common methodology in this line of 
research is to regress various measures of bank risk directly on corporate governance variables. 
  Rather than focusing on a direct link between corporate governance and various risk 
measures, we argue that corporate governance incentives affect banks’ asset choices, which 
ultimately determines the level of risk in the organization.  The obvious motivation for 
investment in opaque assets is higher expected return.  However, the greater investment in 
opacity also leads to higher systematic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk because opaque assets 
are difficult for investors to assess, which reduces their ability to analyze information particular 
to a single firm (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000). The resulting price synchronicity makes firms 
more prone to crashes (Jin and Myers, 2006).   
  Our empirical methodology utilizes various measures of corporate governance to estimate 
their effect on banks’ asset portfolios.  We find that between the years 2000 and 2009, banks 
                                                 
11See Kirkpatrick (2009).  Alan Blinder writes “I refer to the perverse incentives built into the 
compensation plans of many financial firms, incentives that encourage excessive risk-taking with 
OPM -- Other People's Money.” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2009. 
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with relatively aggressive corporate governance held more opaque assets than banks with 
relatively conservative corporate governance.  We then estimate the effect of the marginal 
increase in opacity on the banks’ systematic and systemic risk.  We find strong evidence of 
higher systematic risk, but the evidence on systemic risk is mixed.  
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical relationship between 
corporate governance and opacity, systematic and systemic risk.  Section 3 introduces the data 
and variables.  Section 4 provides the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
B. Corporate Governance, Opacity and Risk  
  Different corporate governance structures provide firms with different incentives for risk-
taking.  We focus on three of these incentive structures: incentive alignment between 
shareholders and managers, ownership structure, and board effectiveness.  All else equal, banks 
that embed stronger shareholder incentives into managerial compensation will operate with more 
risk.  Managers are typically risk-averse because, unlike shareholders, their human capital is 
invested with the firm and they are not well diversified; consequently, managers will choose a 
relatively low level of risk.  But if compensation is heavily weighted towards aggressive 
performance targets through bonuses or through stock and option compensation, managers will 
act more in shareholder interests.  Leaven and Levine (2009) find that bank risk is significantly 
higher in banks that have owners with large cash flow rights (managers).  Owner controlled 
banks exhibit higher risk-taking behavior than banks controlled by managers with small 
shareholdings.  However, studies of the financial crisis find at best a weak link between 
compensation structures and bank risk.  Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) find no evidence that 
option compensation had an adverse impact on bank performance during the crisis.  They also 
show that bank CEOs did not reduce their shareholdings in anticipation of nor during the crisis, 
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nor did they hedge their equity exposure.  Similarly, Acrey, McCumber and Nguyen (2011) find 
weak correlation between executive compensation focused on short-term performance and bank 
risk during the financial crisis. 
  In addition to compensation, strong bank boards with independent directors should 
encourage risk-taking because outsiders are, on average, more diversified than inside owners.  
Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) find that risk-taking and the degree of managerial control in non-
financial firms are inversely related.  Adams (2009) finds that U.S banks that received TARP 
funds had more independent boards.  In addition to being more diversified, independent board 
members may lack the industry-specific banking knowledge necessary to monitor the actions of 
the CEO.  Guerrera and Thal-Larsen’s (2008) study eight major US financial institutions and 
find that two-thirds of directors had no banking experience.  Moreover, many of the directors 
with little or no financial background sat on highly technical board committees covering audit 
and risk.  For example, before the crisis, Northern Rock had only two board members with 
banking experience, and at Bear Stearns, six out of thirteen directors had no banking background.  
At Lehman Brothers, only one board member had financial sector knowledge.  In a similar vein, 
greater blockholder ownership and bank risk-taking should be positively correlated because 
blockholders are typically well diversified institutional investors.  
  Board effectiveness can also vary by factors such as board size, classified boards, 
cumulative voting, dual appointment of the CEO as board chairman, and the presence of poison 
pills, and golden parachutes.  When a bank board is more effective, i.e., better representing the 
bank shareholders’ interests, shareholders prefer more risk taking. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)  
This is also consistent with Pathan (2009) that stronger bank boards, captured by smaller board 
size, and more independent directors are positively related to bank risk taking because bank 
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shareholders have preferences for excessive risk to take advantage of moral hazard derived from 
incomplete debt contract and limited liability.  
  Banks are inherently opaque because they make loans to businesses based on private 
information.  Morgan (2002) determines that the banking industry is opaque relative to other 
industries because the incidence of split ratings on bond issues is higher in the banking industry.  
Opaque assets are more profitable than transparent assets (Jones, Lee, Yeager, 2011A).  
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that banks with corporate governance structures that 
encourage risk-taking would hold more opaque assets than more conservatively governed banks. 
  Bank investments in opaque assets create more systematic risk, and potentially, more 
systemic risk.  In their seminal paper, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that stock prices 
exhibit more synchronicity in poor countries than in rich economies because the dearth of 
information makes it difficult for investors to trade on firm-specific information.  Jin and Myers 
(2006) find that the cross-country variation in synchronicity reflects differences in opacity across 
countries.  Outside investors bear less idiosyncratic risk and more systematic risk as opacity 
increases.  Moreover, stocks of more opaque banks produce larger negative returns, and in 
conjunction with increased price synchronicity, raises the likelihood of a systemic market crash.  
Vallascas and Keasey (2009) find similar results for the banking industry.  Using earnings 
management as a measure of opacity, Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009) find that opacity is 
associated with higher systematic risk as measured by higher R-squared values in market model 
regressions.  In addition, they find that opaque firms are more prone to stock crashes.12Haggard 
and Howe (2007) use the model of Jin and Myers (2006) to examine the relative opacity of banks 
                                                 
12They define the crash dummy variable as equal to one if the firm experiences one or more 
firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.09 standard deviations below the mean weekly firm-
specific returns for that fiscal year; otherwise, the crash dummy value is set equal to zero. 
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and find that banks have less firm-specific information in their equity returns than industrial 
matching firms, consistent with banks being more opaque than industrial firms. 
C. Data and Variable Descriptions 
Our methodology consists primarily of 2SLS regressions where in the first stage we 
regress measures of corporate governance on bank asset composition.  We then regress measures 
of systematic and systemic risk on the predicted loan composition to estimate the marginal effect 
of corporate governance on bank risk. 
  Our sample consists of publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) between 2001 
and 2009.13  Quarterly financial data on the BHCs come from the Federal Reserve FR Y-9C 
reports.  Because the reporting threshold for the FR Y-9C was raised from $150 million to $500 
million in 2006, the sample includes only BHCs with more than $500 million in inflation-
adjusted assets in 2009 dollars.  Stock market data come from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP).  The sample includes 199 BHCs and 6692 bank-quarter observations.   
  Loans and trading assets are a bank’s primary sources of opacity.   We decompose loans 
into commercial real estate loans (COML), residential real estate loans (RESL), and all other 
loans (OTHL).  Trading assets (TRADE) are concentrated primarily in large banks; they consist 
of securities and derivative instruments that a bank intends to buy or sell on an ongoing basis.   
Other opaque assets (OTHO) includes (1) mortgage-backed securities, including non-agency 
issues, and (2) asset-backed securities, which include credit card receivables, home equity lines, 
automobile loans, other consumer loans, and commercial and industrial loans that are not 
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by a federal government-related entity.  Transparent assets 
(TRANSP) include cash, federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to resell. 
                                                 
13
 We refer to these entities either as “banks” or “BHCs” throughout the paper.    
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  Banks corporate governance data are hand-collected from DEF 14A proxy statements of 
the annual meetings recorded in SEC’s EDGAR filing, and yearly data from RiskMetrics 
(formerly IRRC) and Corporate Library.14  Governance variables are chosen in part by data 
availability.  The merger of data from FR Y-9C, CRSP, and Corporate Governance data results 
in 133 BHCs over the period from 2001 to 2009.   
  We use ten variables to proxy for corporate governance.  COMP is the percentage of stock-
based compensation; INSID is the percentage of insider ownership; INST is percentage of block-
holding ownership, which is defined as more than 5% of total floating shares; and B_Index, the 
board index, is sum of seven dummy variables.  Each of these seven dummy variables equals one 
when it signals aggressive board governance, and zero otherwise.  Namely, board size equals one 
if the number of directors on the board is less than sample median because it is easier for smaller 
boards to reach agreements.  Board director independence equals one if the percentage of 
independent directors is more than the sample median. An independent director has no existing 
or former employment relationship with the bank or its immediate family members and does not 
have any significant business ties with the bank.  Classified board equals one if the board is not 
staggered; cumulative voting equals one if there is cumulative voting; CEO duality equals one if 
the CEO is not also the board chairman; poison pill equals one if the bank board has no provision 
for poison pill; and golden parachute equals one if no severance agreements exist that provide 
cash and noncash compensation to senior executives upon an event such as termination, 
demotion, or resignation following a change in control. To control for the delay in the impact of 
corporate governance on bank performance and risk-taking, we apply one-year lags of these 
corporate governance variables – COMP, INSID, INST, and B_Index,  in empirical tests.   
                                                 
14Specifically, hand-collected governance variables include classified board, board size, CEO 
power, golden parachute, block-holder ownership, and poison pill. 
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  A composite of governance Index (“G”) is the sum of one point for the existence of 24 
provisions from five categories: delay, protection, voting, other, and State. A composite index of 
entrenchment is measured with the “E” index, based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits 
to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements for mergers and charter amendments..  Since G_index and B_index shrink the 
sample size to less than 50 unique BHCs, they are reported only in summary statistics.    
  The regressions include several control variables.  Credit risk is measured by non-
performing loans (NPL), which are loans more than 90 days past due or no longer accruing 
interest.  They are scaled by total assets.  We expect that higher NPL leads to lower profitability 
and a reduced ability to invest in opaque assets.   The capital ratio (CAP) is defined as the ratio 
of total equity to total assets.  Because bank with more capital have more cushion to absorb 
adverse shocks, we would expect banks’ performance during the crisis to be positively related to 
the capital ratio.  The ratio of liquid assets to total asset (LIQ) captures liquidity risk.  Generally, 
when trading assets are more liquid, markets function better.  However, Myers and Rajan (1998) 
argue that the unusually liquid nature of trading securities can produce unintended consequences 
because it does not force the management of the institution to make credible commitments to 
investment strategies that protect investors – a characteristic that Morgan (2002) calls “slippery”.  
The expected sign of liquidity is undetermined.  The log of total asset (LNTA) and square of the 
log of total asset (SQLNTA) control for size differences among banks that may affect their 
performance.  Return on average assets (ROA) is net income divided by average assets.  We 
expect higher ROA to be correlated with higher risk. 
  We also computed measures of systematic and systemic risk.  The three Fama-French 
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(1992) variables are used as risk proxies to calculate expected return in the model:15 
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whereMKT is the daily equal-weighted CRSP index minus the risk free rate, SMB is the Fama-
French daily size factor, and HML is the Fama-French daily value factor.  Following Morck, 
Yeung, and Yu (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006), we measure stock market synchronicity by 
R2as follows: 
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  Here, R2is the percent of the variation in the daily returns of each bank’s stock return 
explained by variations in the U.S. market return, SSR is the sum of squared bank return 
variations, SST is the sum of squared total market return variations, and Yi is each bank’s stock 
return.  It should be noted that the stock price synchronicity measure is unsuitable as a dependent 
variable in OLS regressions because they are bounded within the intervals [0,1].   Therefore we 
adopt a standard econometric remedy and apply the logistic transformation of R2 to create phi as 
in equation (3): 
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  Measures of systemic risk from the “cross-default” perspective can broadly be separated 
into two categories, one based on a structural approach using contingent claims analysis of the 
financial institution's assets, and the other on a reduced form approach focusing on the tail 
                                                 
15Beta1 is the coefficient of market factor in CAPM that applies the three-factor Fama-French 
(1992). R2 is the part of stock return explained by market return for each BHC by each quarter.  
Φ is log-transformed R2.  
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behavior of financial institutions' asset returns.  In the first category, the limited liability of banks 
and presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise 
to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby 
increasing economy-wide aggregate risk.  
  Lehar (2005) proposes a risk management approach to estimate the probability of a 
simultaneous default of several banks by using stock-market information.  The second category 
applies to the asset correlation. Acharya (2009) modeled systemic risk as the endogenously 
chosen correlation of returns held by banks.  Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) measure systemic risk 
by the price of insurance against financial distress, based on ex ante measure of default 
probabilities of individual banks and forecast asset return correlations.  Specifically, they use 
realized correlations estimate from high-frequency equity return, and their results suggest that 
the theoretical insurance premium that would be charged to protect against losses that equal or 
exceed 15% of total liabilities of 12 major US financial firms.   
  We construct two measures of systemic risk.  The first is the ratio of the bank return’s 
skewness over the market return’s skewness (a relative crash risk measurement). Following Jin 
and Myers (2006), crash likelihood measurement is defined as the skewness of residual returns, 
i.e., third moment of each stock’s residual returns divided by the cubed standard deviation.  
Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) measure crash as an indicator variable equal to one if 
within its fiscal year a firm experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.09 or 
more standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly return for its fiscal year and equal 
to zero otherwise. In this paper, we construct the ratio of bank return skewness to market return 
skewness to capture the relative crash frequency. 
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  We also construct the M3T_CORR as the second systemic risk measurement.  M3T_CORR 
is defined as the asset weighted correlation composite of each bank’s third moment OLS residual 
(M3T) with all other banks in the sample.  The third moment OLS residual is asymptotically 
distributed as a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance of 6 times cubed second 
moment, defined as M2 divided by N.  The Coelli (1995) M3T statistics is superior to Jin and 
Myers (2006) simplified statistics because the M3T statistics is asymptotically normalized.  
Specifically,   
M3T = 3M / NM /6 32
    
(6) 
 
  Instead of focusing on the “contemporaneous-default probability” as the skewness ratio, the 
M3T correlation emphasizes the “cross-default probability”, i.e., the contagion of bank failure.  
The correlation of M3T is measured as follows and each bank is calculated a M3T correlation 
composite weighted by other correlating banks’ asset size.   
ρM3T =  Correlation of M3T across banks        (7) 
  Table 1 describes the bank financial variables, market variables, corporate governance 
variables and control variables.  The statistics show that banks in the sample have substantial 
variation.   The mean inflation-adjusted asset size of sample banks is $35.5 billion while median 
asset size is $2.5 billion. On average, loans represent two-thirds of total assets.  The components 
in the loan portfolio, COML, RESL, and OTHL represent 22%, 18%, and 26% of total assets 
respectively.  OPATRA and TRADE are27% and 0.6% of total assets.  Because the majority of 
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banks in the sample hold no trading assets, the level of opaque trading assets varies widely 
across banks from zero to 33%.  Average transparent asset is 6.9% of sample banks, ranging 
from zero to 59%. 
  All financial variables have wide ranges.  For instance, average ROA is 0.88% during 2001 
and 2009 and it ranges from -38.97% to 21.43%. LIQ ranges from 0.36% to 6.2%, and the 
average NPL from 0.04% to 0.37%. .   Corporate governance variables also exhibit large cross-
sectional differences. Median management ownership is 7.8% and it ranges from zero to 94%.  
The percentages of sample banks with CEO duality and golden parachutes are 61% and 81%, 
respectively.  Sample banks hold on average 14 board members, 72% of classified board, and 
mean outside independent directors is 85% which ranges from 43% to 100%.  Median block-
holders ownership is 25%, ranging from zero to 96%.   Finally, the E index medium is 3 with a 
minimum of 0 (strong governance) and maximum of 6 (weak governance). 
  The median R2 of the sample is 27.3% and it ranges from zero to 82%.  The log 
transformed R2, Φ, has mean of -1.436, from -8.9 to 1.48.  The skewness ratio has the mean of    
-0.048 and ranges from -45.05 to 66.45. The average of M3T_CORR is 0.09 and ranges from      
-0.27 to 0.63.  Figure 1 plots the distribution of Φ, return skewness, skewness ratio, and 
M3T_CORR, respectively.  This sample shows a high degree of concentration of R2 around zero 
to 0.04, and log-transformed R2 (Φ) is negatively skewed with average mean of -1.42. 
Figure 2 shows the propensity to crash using the skewness of residuals as the measure of crash 
likelihood as in Jin and Myers (2006). 16 A crash is defined as a negative outlier in a firm’s 
residual return.  Lower values for skewness mean more negative outliers in the distribution of  
                                                 
16
 Sample has a positive skewness when the right tail is longer; the mass of the distribution is 
concentrated on the left of the figure. It has relatively few high values. The distribution is said to 
be right-skewed. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of BHCs   
 
This table shows summary statistics of 199 bank holding companies with inflation adjusted 
assets (TA) greater than $500 million.  Financial variables data are from quarter-end FY Y-9C, 
expressed as a percent of total assets. LOAN is the ratio of total loan to total assets; COML is 
commercial real estate loans; RESL is residential real estate loans;  OTHL are all other loans; 
and OTHO are other opaque assets.  TRADE is trading assets. TA is total inflation-adjusted 
assets in thousands USD.  TRANSP is the % of transparent assets including cash, federal funds 
sold, securities purchased under agreement to resell, guaranteed AFS and HTM securities. ROA 
is net income over total asset.  LIQ is the ratio of all liquid assets to total assets. NPL is the non-
performing loans to total assets.  CAP is the ratio of average equity to average asset.   Market 
return data is collected from CRSP.  R2 , the part of stock return explained by market return in 
CAPM that applies the three-factor Fama-French (1992) for each BHC by each quarter is log 
transformed into Phi. Skew ratio is defined as the ratio of each bank holding company’s return 
skewness to the market return skewness by quarter. M3T_CORR is asset weighted correlation 
composite of each bank’s M3T with all other banks in the sample. Corporate governance data is 
hand-collected yearly data from Proxy Statement, Risk-metrics, and Corporate Library.  COMP 
is the percentage of stock-based compensation. INSID is the percentage of insider ownership. 
INST is percentage of block-holding ownership which is defined as more than 5% of total 
floating shares.  B_Index is the sum of seven dummy variables: board size, board director 
independence, classified board, cumulative voting, CEO ownership, poison pill, and golden 
parachute.  Each of the seven dummy variables equals one in favor of strong board governance 
and zero otherwise.  Governance Index (“G”) GI is sum of one point for the existence of 24 
provisions from five categories: Delay, Protection, Voting, Other, and State. Entrenchment Index, 
EI, is based on six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison 
pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Maximum Minimum StdDev 
LOAN  6692 0.66 0.68 0.93 0.04 0.14 
    COML  6692 0.22 0.21 0.81 0.00 0.16 
    RESL  6692 0.18 0.18 0.58 0.00 0.10 
    OTHL  6692 0.26 0.22 0.85 0.00 0.16 
OTHO  6661 0.27 0.25 0.99 0.00 0.12 
TRADE  6661 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.03 
TRANSP  6692 0.07 0.05 0.59 0.00 0.08 
TA  6692 3.55×107 2.53×106 2.361×109 4.99×105 1.84×108 
ROA  6692 0.88 1.09 21.43 -38.97 1.89 
LIQ  6692 1.65 0.325 6.20 0.04 0.32 
NPL  6692 0.01 0.01 0.37 0.00 0.01 
CAP  6692 0.09 0.09 0.80 0.00 0.05 
RSQ  6692 0.27 0.27 0.82 0.00 0.20 
PHI  6692 -1.44 -1.00 1.49 -8.94 1.53 
SKEW RATIO  6692 -0.05 -0.05 66.45 -45.05 4.69 
M3T_CORR  6692 0.09 0.08 0.63 -0.27 0.16 
COMP  2744 0.57 0.58 1 0 0.24 
INSID  2744 0.12 0.08 0.94 0 0.13 
INST  2744 0.14 0.09 1 0 0.30 
B_INDEX  2744 2.82 3 5 1 1.21 
GI  1936 9.33 9 15 2 2.95 
EI  1704 3.10 3 6 0 1.45 
 residual returns.  It is evident from the figure that there is a high likelihood of a crash after 2007.   
  The sample statistics of financial variables vary widely over time as shown in Table 2.  As 
expected, ROA falls sharply from 2001 to 2009 from 1.2% to 0.2% and NPL doubles from 0.5% 
to 1%.  Banks hold more loan and opaque trading assets over time.  Systematic risk as measured 
by Φ rises over time and idiosyncratic risk declines.   The skew ratio declines while M3T_CORR 
increases significantly.  Average bank systematic risk and the percentage of opaque asset over 
time is presented in Figure 3.  It is apparent from the figure that opaque asset investment and 
bank systematic have the same upward. In contrast, corporate governance proxies are time-
invariant variables and do not change significantly over time.17 
  In Table 3 is a correlation matrix of the key variables.  The correlations for all key 
variables used in the study exhibit some notable patterns. Larger banks with higher systematic 
risk tend to have a higher percentage of stock-based compensation, less managerial ownership, 
less block-holder ownership, and stronger board governance.  The skewness ratio has the 
opposite relationship with the corporate governance variables as expected.  The transparent asset 
ratio is significantly negatively related with opaque assets and trading assets.  Stock-based 
compensation is positively related with trading assets and most of the opaque assets. Inside 
ownership and block-holder ownership are negatively correlated with stock-based compensation.  
In general, banks with more stock-based compensation, less insider ownership, less block-holder 
ownership, and more effective board structure generally choose more opaque investments. 
 
                                                 
17It is suggested in Pathan (2009) that the estimation method of the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank risk-taking should be generalized least square random effect (RE) 
instead of fixed effect (FE). Stable corporate governance variables cannot be estimated with FE 
regression as it would be absorbed or wiped out in “within transformation’ or ‘time-demeaning’ 
process of FE.  We tested FE in robustness checks and the results are consistent. 
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Figure 1A:  Distribution of Φ 
 
This figure plots the distribution of log transformed R2, Φ, over 6,692 quarterly observations.  
Here, R2 is the percent of the variation in the daily returns of each bank’s stock return explained 
by variations in the U.S. market return.  Stock price synchronicity measure is unsuitable as 
dependent variables in regressions because they are bounded within the intervals [0,1].   
Therefore we adopt a standard econometric remedy and apply logistic transformations in 
equation.  Specifically, Φ is defined as follows. 
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2
2log 1
i
i
R
R
 
Φ =  −   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1B:  Distribution of bank return skewness 
 
This figure plots the distribution of bank return skewness, over 6,692 quarterly observations.  
Skewness is defined as the third moment of each stock’s residual returns as follows. 
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Figure 1C:  Distribution of Skewness Ratio 
 
This figure plots the distribution of bank return skewness ratio, over 6,692 quarterly 
observations.  Skewness ratio is a relative crash risk measurement, defined as the ratio of bank 
return’s skewness over market return’s skewness. 
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Figure 1D:  Distribution of M3T_CORR 
 
M3T_CORR is defined as the asset weighted correlation composite of each bank’s third moment 
of OLS residual (M3T) with all other banks in the sample.  The third moment of OLS residual is 
asymptotically distributed as a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance of “6 times 
cubed M2 divided by N”.  i.e.,
NM
M
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Further, the M3T correlation emphasizes the “cross-default probability”, i.e., the contagion of 
bank failure.  The correlation of M3T is measured as follows and each bank is calculated a “M3T 
correlation composite” weighted by other correlating banks’ asset size.   
                                                  ρM3T = Correlation of M3T across banks                         
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Figure 2:  Propensity of Crash Increase over Years   
 
Figure 2 graphs the propensity to crash using the skewness of residuals as the measure of crash 
likelihood as in Jin and Myers (2006).  A crash is defined as a negative outlier in a firm’s 
residual return.  Lower values for skewness mean more negative outliers in the distribution of 
residual returns.  It is evident from the figure that there is a high likelihood of a crash post 2007.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Bank Log-transformed R2 and Opaque Investments Increase Over Years 
 
Average bank systematic risk and the percentage of opaque asset over time is presented in Figure 
3.  Banks hold more loan and opaque trading assets over time.  Also, systematic risk as measured 
by Φ rises over time.   
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 Table 2: Summary Statistics of BHCs by Period Subsamples 
 
This table lists summary statistics of subsamples decomposed by period and quintile bank size.  Samples are pre-crisis period from 
2001 to 2006 and post crisis period from 2007 to 2009.  Samples are further quintile-decomposed with decomposed by bank asset size.  
All variables are defined in Table 2.1 
 
   Asset Composition Control Variables Ret Risk Corporate Governance 
 
  TA 
LOA
N COML RESL OTHL OTHO TRADE TRAN LIQ NPL CAP ROA RSQ Phi 
Skew_
R 
 
M3T
Corr  COMP INSID INST BI GI EI 
P
r
e
-
c
r
i
s
i
s
 
(
2
0
0
1
-
2
0
0
6
)
 
mean 2.92×107 0.64 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.00 0.08 2.15 0.01 0.09 1.22 0.24 -1.61 0.02 0.05 0.58 0.12 0.14 2.73 9.61 2.92 
5th 6.37×105 0.39 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.43 0.01 -4.52 -6.00 -0.19 0.14 0.011 0.00 1.00 4.00 0.00 
25th 1.09×106 0.59 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.00 0.08 0.95 0.08 -2.51 -1.40 -0.03 0.43 0.04 0.05 2.00 8.00 2.00 
median 2.21×106 0.67 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.00 0.05 0.35 0.00 0.09 1.20 0.23 -1.20 -0.02 0.03 0.58 0.08 0.09 3.00 9.50 3.00 
75th 6.83×106 0.73 0.35 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.09 0.46 0.01 0.10 1.47 0.38 -0.49 1.24 0.15 0.79 0.14 0.15 4.00 
12.0
0 4.00 
95th 8.46×107 0.82 0.53 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.02 0.24 0.85 0.01 0.12 1.97 0.56 0.23 6.04 0.32 0.93 0.37 0.39 5.00 
14.0
0 5.00 
Std Dev. 1.44×108 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.09 39.14 0.00 0.04 0.91 0.18 1.49 4.89 0.15 0.24 0.13 0.37 1.22 2.88 1.43 
N 4526                               1425           
D
u
r
i
n
g
 
c
r
i
s
i
s
 
(
2
0
0
7
-
2
0
0
9
)
 
mean 4.87×107 0.68 0.14 0.17 0.37 0.25 0.01 0.06 0.62 0.01 0.10 0.21 0.33 -1.08 -0.19 0.06 0.57 0.11 0.15 2.96 9.35 3.73 
5th 8.68×105 0.42 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 -2.81 0.02 -4.15 -6.77 -0.19 0.20 0.011 0.00 1.00 4.00 2.00 
25th 1.62×106 0.64 0.02 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.13 -1.94 -1.86 -0.04 0.44 0.04 0.06 2.00 8.00 3.00 
median 3.27×106 0.71 0.04 0.17 0.41 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.28 0.01 0.09 0.73 0.36 -0.57 -0.11 0.04 0.58 0.07 0.12 3.00 9.00 4.00 
75th 9.34×106 0.76 0.25 0.23 0.51 0.30 0.00 0.07 0.39 0.02 0.11 1.10 0.51 0.02 1.44 0.15 0.72 0.13 0.20 4.00 
11.0
0 5.00 
95th 1.26×108 0.84 0.49 0.32 0.65 0.45 0.03 0.20 0.72 0.05 0.13 1.70 0.65 0.62 5.90 0.32 0.93 0.32 0.47 5.00 
14.0
0 5.00 
Std Dev. 2.47×108 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.07 3.46 0.02 0.05 2.89 0.21 1.54 4.27 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.15 1.17 2.81 1.26 
N 2166                           1319           
Diff. of Mean b/w sub-periods 0.04 -0.13 -0.01 0.17 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -1.53 0.01 0.01 -1.01 0.09 0.52 -0.21 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.22 -0.26 0.81 
Significance   *** ** ***   *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * *** * *** *** ***     *** 
Diff. of Median b/w sub-
periods 0.04 -0.20 -0.01 0.21 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.47 0.13 0.63 -0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.50 1.00 
Significance *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** **   **   *** *** ** *** 
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D. Empirical Tests and Analysis 
  To motivate a bank’s rationale for holding opaque assets, we first estimate the effect of 
opacity on bank profitability for the years 2001 through 2009.  Table 4 presents results from 
regressing ROA on asset composition.  Panel A lists results for the full sample, Panel B includes 
the boom years 2001-2006, and  Panel C includes the financial crisis years 2007-2009.  The 
overall results in Panel A show a positive relationship between opacity and profitability, though 
the results are somewhat mixed.  The coefficient on the percentage of commercial real estate is 
positive but statistically insignificant, and the coefficient on other loans is negative and 
significant.  The mixed results seem to be due to the differing effects of opacity on ROA in the 
boom years and the crisis years.  Panel B, which reflects the boom years, shows a consistently 
positive relationship between opacity and ROA, thought the coefficients on other loans and other 
opaque assets are insignificant.  Similarly, the coefficients on transparent assets are positive but 
insignificant.  During the crisis years, opaque assets harm profitability.  The coefficients on 
commercial real estate, residential real estate, and other loans are all negative, while the 
coefficient on transparent assets is positive and significant.  The results overall indicate that 
opacity boosts profitability when the economic and real estate markets are strong. 
  Next we estimate the effects of various corporate governance incentives on bank asset 
composition.   Table 5 shows the results from regressing commercial real estate loans, residential 
loans, other loans, other opaque assets, and transparent assets. We expect more aggressive 
corporate governance to lead to greater investment in opaque assets; consequently, we expect the 
coefficients on stock-based compensation, institutional ownership, and board index to be positive 
when regressed against commercial real estate, residential real estate, and other opaque assets.   
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix   
 
This table shows the correlation matrix of sample variables.  All variables are defined in Table 2.1.  *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance of at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
 
  COML RESL OTHL OTHO TRADE TRANSP LIQ NPL CAP ROA RSQ SKEW  Ratio COMP INSID INST BI 
COML 1 
               
RESL -0.15 1 
              
OTHL -0.63 -0.19 1 
             
OTHO  -0.23 -0.15 -0.27 1 
            
TRADE -0.23 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 1 
           
TRANSP -0.19 -0.19 -0.14 -0.15 0.27 1 
          
LIQ -0.24 -0.22 -0.24 0.58 0.14 0.4 1 
         
NPL -0.26 -0.08 0.45 -0.2 -0.03 -0.02 -0.1 1 
        
CAP 0.08 -0.08 0.12 -0.08 -0.19 -0.12 -0.24 -0.08 1 
       
ROA 0.22 0.06 -0.35 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.61 0.09 1 
      
RSQ -0.14 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.1 0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.14 0.06 1 
     
SKEWRATIO -0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 1 
    
COMP -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.32 0.05 0.11 -0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.14 -0.03 1 
   
INSID 0.06 -0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.16 0 -0.06 1 
  
INST 0.04 -0.03 0 0 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0 0.01 0.28 1 
 
BI -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.29 0.1 1 
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Table 4:  Regressions of ROA on Bank Assets 
 
Panel A lists results for the full sample, Panel B includes the boom years 2001-2006, and  Panel 
C includes the financial crisis years 2007-2009.  ROA is net income to average assets.   Financial 
variables data are from quarter-end FY Y-9C, expressed as a percent of total assets.  LOAN is 
the ratio of total loan to total assets; COML is commercial real estate loans; RESL is residential 
real estate loans; OTHL are all other loans; and OTHO are other opaque assets.  TRADE is 
trading assets. TA is total inflation-adjusted assets in thousands USD. TRANSP is the % of 
transparent assets including cash, federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreement to 
resell, guaranteed AFS and HTM securities. ROA is net income over total asset.  LIQ is the ratio 
of all liquid assets to total assets. NPL is the non-performing loans to total assets.  CAP is the 
ratio of average equity to average asset.  LN(TA) is natural log of total assets.  SQLN(TA) is 
square of LN(TA). *, **, ***denote statistical significance of at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable ROA 
OLS 
Panel A                           
2001-2009 
Panel B                         
2001-2006 
Panel C                                       
2007-2009 
Intercept -0.416 -3.532 *** 4.314 
 
   COML 0.102 0.321 *** -0.903 ** 
   RESL 0.514 *** 0.497 *** -0.284 
 
   OTHL -0.384 ** 0.037 -0.935 *** 
OTHO 0.343 ** 0.049 0.912 ** 
TRANSP 0.426 ** 0.095 1.642 *** 
LIQ -0.001 * -0.001 *** -0.007 
 CAP 14.687 *** 14.095 *** 15.332 *** 
NPL -59.950 *** -36.385 *** -60.595 *** 
LN(TA) -0.034 0.320 *** -0.536 
 SQLN(TA) 0.002 -0.008 *** 0.015 
 Year Dummy: Yes   
 
  
 District Dummy: Yes     
 N 6692   4526   2166 
Adj R-Sq:    0.405   0.546 0.343   
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Table 5:  Regressions of Bank Assets on Corporate Governance Variables 
 
This table shows the results from regressing commercial real estate loans, residential loans, other 
loans, other opaque assets, and transparent assets, respectively, on lagged corporate governance 
variables.  Full sample results are in Panel A and the subsamples are in Panels B and C.  *, **, 
***denote statistical significance of at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively.  
 
 
 
Panel A                                                                                                                      
2001-2009 
Dependent Variable COML RESL  OTHL OTHO TRANSP 
Intercept 0.538 *** -0.244 * -0.532 *** 0.286 ** 0.956 *** 
L_COMP 0.002 
 
0.033 *** 0.017 * 0.017 ** -0.004   
L_INSID 0.015 
 
0.038 *** 0.018 
 
-0.006 0.011   
L_INST 0.029 *** 0.008 * -0.036 *** 0.000 0.000   
L_BI -0.003 ** 0.005 *** -0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.000   
LIQ -0.035 *** -0.053 *** -0.077 *** 0.111 *** 0.054 *** 
CAP 0.097 
 
-0.747 *** 0.512 *** -0.006 0.165 *** 
NPL -0.207 
 
-1.032 *** 2.012 *** -0.870 *** 0.094   
LN(TA) -0.033 
 
0.062 *** 0.105 *** -0.022 -0.112 *** 
SQLN(TA) 0.000 
 
-0.002 *** -0.003 *** 0.001 ** 0.003 *** 
Year Dummies: Yes 
  
       
  Dist. Dummies: Yes 
R-Square     0.655 
 
0.334 
 
0.653 
 
0.499 0.245   
N 2744                   
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Panel B                                                                                                                      
2001-2006 
Dependent 
Variable COMMREAL RESREAL  OTHLOAN OTHO TRANSP 
Intercept 0.832 *** -0.461 ** -1.362 *** 0.489 ** 1.500 *** 
L_COMP 0.019 
 
0.012 ** -0.005 
 
0.014 
 
-0.017 *** 
L_INSID 0.031 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.010 
 
0.000 
 
-0.018 
L_INST -0.002 
 
0.011 * -0.010 * 0.004 
 
-0.002 
L_BI -0.004 
 
0.008 *** -0.011 *** 0.008 *** -0.001 
LIQ -0.066 *** -0.060 *** -0.024 *** 0.091 *** 0.059 *** 
CAP 0.763 *** -0.936 *** 0.313 *** -0.290 ** 0.199 
NPL -2.403 ** 1.492 ** 9.437 *** -3.835 *** -4.797 *** 
LN(TA) -0.041 
 
0.094 *** 0.162 *** -0.047 * -0.169 *** 
SQLN(TA) 0.000 
 
-0.003 *** -0.004 *** 0.002 ** 0.005 *** 
Year Dummies: 
Yes 
  
     
  
  
Dist. Dummies: 
Yes 
  R-Square     0.555 
 
0.378 
 
0.506 
 
0.513 
 
0.353 
 N 1425                   
 
 
 
Panel C                                                                                                                      
2007-2009 
Dependent Variable COMMREAL RESREAL  OTHLOAN OTHO TRANSP 
Intercept 0.728 -0.084 -0.413 * 0.203 0.599 *** 
L_COMP 0.004 
 
-0.055 *** 0.065 *** -0.005 
 
-0.006 
L_INSID 0.006 
 
-0.097 *** 0.033 
 
-0.010 
 
0.074 *** 
L_INST 0.059 *** 0.000 -0.059 *** 0.000 
 
0.004 
L_BI -0.003 
 
0.004 ** -0.008 *** 0.006 *** 0.001 
LIQ -0.021 *** -0.048 *** -0.111 *** 0.149 0.032 *** 
CAP -0.102 -0.589 *** 0.360 ** 0.112 0.192 ** 
NPL -0.111 -0.974 *** 1.673 *** -0.793 *** 0.159 * 
LN(TA) -0.063 ** 0.042 ** 0.105 *** -0.015 -0.072 *** 
SQLN(TA) 0.001 * -0.001 * -0.003 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 
Year Dummies: Yes 
  
     
    Dist. Dummies: Yes 
    R-Square     0.704 
 
0.33 
 
0.646 
 
0.56 
 
0.182 
 N 1319                   
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The same coefficients on insider ownership should be negative.  As expected, the results for the 
full sample and the boom period indicate that more aggressive corporate governance leads to 
higher investments in residential loans and other opaque assets, and lower investments in 
transparent assets.  Corporate governance seems to have little effect, however, on commercial 
real estate. 
  Previous research has documented a strong correlation between opaque assets and 
systematic risk.  We confirm this relationship for our bank sample by regressing phi on asset 
composition.  As expected, the results in Table 6 over the full sample show that commercial real 
estate, residential real estate, other loans, other opaque assets are all positively correlated with 
phi while transparent assets are negatively correlated. 
  We are interested in capturing the marginal effects of corporate governance on systematic 
risk.  To do so, we use a 2SLS procedure where we first regress asset composition on corporate 
governance.  Those results are in Table 5.  In the second stage, we regress phi on the predicted 
asset composition from the first stage.  The second-stage results are in Table 7. 
  Full sample results show that the predicted residential loans and other loans increase 
systematic risk, but commercial real estate loans and other opaque assets reduce systematic risk.   
  We are also interested in capturing the marginal effects of corporate governance on 
systemic risk.  The first set of results in Tables 8 and 9 use the skewness ratio as the measure of 
systemic risk.  Table 8 regresses the skewness ratio on banks’ asset composition.  We expect 
opaque assets to be correlated with a left-hand skew so that the coefficients are negative.  Indeed 
all the asset composition variables except transparent assets are negative for the full sample.  
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Table 6:  Regressions of Φ on Bank Assets 
 
The dependent variable is Φ, the log-transformed R-square.  All other variables are defined as in 
previous tables.  *, **, ***denote statistical significance of at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level 
respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Φ 
 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent WLS 
2001-2009 2001-2006 2007-2009 
Intercept -44.745 *** -45.373 *** -46.510   
COML 0.190 ** 0.222 ** 0.059 
RESL 0.196 * 0.206   0.084 
OTHL 0.700 *** 0.286 * 0.528 *** 
OTHO 0.190 ** -0.128   -0.108 
TRANSP -0.504 *** -0.174   -0.563 ** 
LIQ -0.001 0.000   0.003 
NPL 2.400 *** 1.728 *** 2.125 *** 
CAP -9.409 *** -18.477 *** -12.044 *** 
LN(TA) 4.950 *** 4.984 *** 5.114 *** 
SQLN(TA) -0.137 *** -0.140 *** -0.139 *** 
Year Dummy: Yes   
District Dummy: Yes   
N 6692 4526 2166 
Adj R-Sq 0.42 0.43 0.45 
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Table 7:  Regressions of Φ on Predicted Bank Assets 
 
This table is the second-stage regression of Φ on predicted values of opacity 
measurements computed from the regression in Table 5.  Φ is the log-transformed R-
square of stock return explained by market return in CAPM that applies the three-factor 
Fama-French (1992).  All other variables are defined as in previous tables. *, **, 
***denote statistical significance of at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Φ 
Panel A                      
2001-2009 
Panel B                        
2001-2006 
Panel C                      
2007-2009 
Intercept -7.893 *** -1.658 -18.541 *** 
COML -0.859 *** -0.954 ** 1.521 *** 
RESL 1.101 *** 1.265 *** 0.360 
OTHL 1.432 *** -0.289 0.235 
OTHO -0.962 ** -1.322 *** 0.905 
TRANSP -0.712   1.301 -3.020 ** 
LIQ 0.254 *** 0.036 0.047 
CAP 5.800 *** 2.611 5.025 *** 
NPL -14.902 *** -7.797 -12.189 *** 
LN(TA) 0.722 *** 0.046 1.875 *** 
SQLN(TA) -0.019 *** -0.001 -0.049 *** 
Year Dummies: Yes     
Dist. Dummies: Yes     
Adj R-Sq 0.12   0.17   0.28   
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Table 8: Regressions of Skewness ratio on Bank Assets   
 
Skewness ratio is defined as the ratio of each bank holding company’s return skewness to 
the market return skewness by quarter.  All other variables are defined as in previous 
tables.  *, **, ***denote statistical significance of at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable Skewness Ratio 
 Heteroskedasticity-Consistent WLS 
2001-2009 2001-2006 2007-2009 
Intercept -0.021 3.404 -5.198 
COML -0.366 0.290 -0.913 
RESL -1.408 ** -1.124 ** -1.639 ** 
OTHL -1.891 0.888 0.727 
OTHO -0.802 ** -0.811 -0.795 
TRANSP 0.684 0.757 0.794 
LIQ 0.002 0.002 0.006 
NPL 0.699 0.577 0.316 
CAP -9.753 * -9.470 -12.356 ** 
LN(TA) -0.079 -0.590 0.659 
SQLN(TA) 0.003 0.020 -0.020 
Year Dummy: Yes 
District Dummy: Yes          
  N 6692 4526 2166 
  Adj R-Sq 0.06 0.08 0.16 
       
 
 
  Table 9 captures the marginal effects of corporate governance on skewness.  The table 
reports the second stage regression of skewness on predicted asset composition, which comes 
from the first-stage regressions in Table 5.  The results are mixed.  First, none of the coefficients 
is statistically significant.  Second, the coefficient on residential loans is positive, opposite of 
what we would expect. 
  We also measure systemic risk with M3T, the cross-default correlation of each.  Table 10 
regresses M3T on bank asset composition.  We expect coefficients on the opaque assets to be 
positive, which they are with the exception of commercial real estate. 
  The marginal effects from corporate governance on cross-default correlation are captured 
by a second-stage regression of M3T on predicted asset values estimated from Table 5.  The 
results are mixed with the coefficient on commercial real estate positive and significant, but the 
coefficient on residential real estate negative and insignificant.  In sum, the results fail to show a 
strong relationship between corporate governance and systemic risk.    
E. Conclusion 
  This paper examines the chain effect of bank corporate governance on the choice of bank 
opacity, which then affects systematic risk and systemic risk.   We find that a bank’s asset choice 
including investments in opaque assets are influenced by corporate governance mechanism such 
as managerial incentive design, inside ownership, and board structures; and the asset choices 
made by managers under the influence of corporate governance in turn have an impact on the 
systematic risk borne by investors and the systemic risk borne by the society.   Two main results 
are found in this essay.  First, bank influenced by corporate governance.  Specifically, banks with 
higher percentage of executive stock-based compensation, lower insider ownership, lower 
percentage of block-holder ownership, and more effective boards, are more likely to invest in  
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Table 9: Regressions of Skewness ratio on Predicted Bank Assets   
 
This table shows the second stage regression of the skewness ratio on predicted values of opacity 
measurements from the regression results in Table 2.5.  The skewness ratio is defined as the ratio 
of each bank holding company’s return skewness to the market return skewness by quarter.  All 
other variables are defined as in previous tables.  *, **, ***denote statistical significance of at 
the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable Skew_Ratio 
2nd stage of 2SLS Panel A                                        2001-2009 
Panel B                             
2001-2006 
Panel C                 
2007-2009 
Intercept -1.986   3.801   1.585 
COML -2.001   -3.810   1.119 
RESL 4.138   4.352   4.878 
OTHL -1.216   0.363   -2.236 
OTHO -1.829   0.394   -6.769 
TRANSP 0.909   -1.299   3.008 
LIQ -0.040   -0.240   0.822 
CAP -7.258   -9.931   -0.621 
NPL -10.357   -49.410   -11.465 
LN(TA) 0.370   -0.107   -0.074 
SQLN(TA) -0.010   0.003   0.002 
Year Dummy: Yes           
District Dummy: Yes      
 N 2744 1425 1319 
 Adj R-Sq 0.05 0.05 0.13 
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Table 10:  Regressing M3T_CORR on Bank Assets   
 
M3T_CORR is the asset weighted correlation composite of each bank’s third moment of OLS 
residual (M3T) with all other banks in the sample. All other variables are defined as in previous 
tables. *, **, ***denote statistical significance of at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
 
Dependent 
Variable M3T_CORR 
 Heteroskedasticity-Consistent WLS 
2001-2009 2001-2006 2007-2009 
Intercept 1.248   1.621   1.548 *** 
COML -0.024   0.017   -0.058   
RESL 0.118 *** 0.120 *** 0.091 *** 
OTHL 0.027 * -0.093   0.050 ** 
OTHO 0.110 * 0.116   -0.051   
TRANSP 0.044   -0.073 -0.033   
LIQ 0.016 *** 0.014 ** 0.026 *** 
NPL 0.006   0.062   -0.157 * 
CAP -0.565 *** -3.490 *** -0.526 ** 
LN(TA) -0.193 *** -0.246 *** -0.226 *** 
SQLN(TA) 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 
Year Dummy: Yes           
District Dummy: 
Yes     
 N 6692  4526 2166 
 Adj R-Sq 0.33 0.40 0.38 
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Table 11:  Regressing M3T_CORR on Predicted Bank Assets   
 
This table is the second-stage regression of M3T_CORR on predicted values of bank assets 
derived from Table 2.5.   M3T_CORR is the asset weighted correlation composite of each bank’s 
third moment of OLS residual (M3T) with all other banks in the sample.   All other variables are 
defined as in previous tables.  *, **, ***denote statistical significance of at the 0.1, 0.05, and 
0.01 level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable M3t_corr 
2nd stage of 2SLS 
Panel A                                        
2001-2009 
Panel B                             
2001-2006 
Panel C                
2007-2009 
Intercept 1.859 *** 3.226 *** 1.208 *** 
COML 0.335 *** 0.308 *** 0.201 ** 
RESL -0.045   0.024   -0.021 
OTHL 0.140 -0.124   0.025 
OTHO 0.237 *** 0.325 *** -0.059 
TRANSP -0.387 *** -0.485 *** -0.147 
LIQ 0.015   0.020   0.023 
CAP 0.684 *** 1.366 *** 0.023 
NPL 0.705 * -8.658 *** -0.228 
LN(TA) -0.281 *** -0.453 *** -0.189 *** 
SQLN(TA) 0.010 *** 0.016 *** 0.007 *** 
Year Dummy: Yes           
District Dummy: Yes      
 Obs 2744 1425 1319 
 Adj R-Sq 0.37 0.41 0.13 
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opaque assets and to take higher level of risks. Secondly, bank opacity is endogenously 
influenced by corporate governance.  Specifically, banks with higher percentage of executive 
stock-based compensation, lower insider ownership, lower percentage of block-holder ownership, 
and more effective boards, are more likely to invest in opaque assets and to take higher level of 
risks.  
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Do Credit Rating Agencies Sacrifice Timeliness by 
Pursuing Rating Stability? 
Evidence from Equity Market Reactions  
To CreditWatch Events  
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A.    Introduction  
One of the most surprising events during the 2007-2008 financial crisis was the filing of 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers, an investment bank with a 158-year history, on 
Monday, September 15th, 2008.  The news of Lehman’s collapse shook financial markets world-
wide, including a drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average of more than 500 points.  The 
collapse of Lehman took many investors by surprise because as recently as September 12th, the 
previous Friday, Lehman Brothers’ bonds were rated “A”, an investment grade.   
Though unique in its impact on global markets, the precipitous fall of Lehman from 
investment grade status directly to bankruptcy is not unprecedented.  Several other high-profile 
bankrupt companies, including Enron, also maintained investment-grade ratings until just days 
before the bankruptcy was announced.  Are rating agencies too slow in adjusting ratings? 
Indeed, one major criticism of credit rating agencies is the lack of timeliness in making 
rating changes.18  Studies in the finance literature have shown that credit rating changes are 
anticipated by the equity market (Norden and Weber (2004)), the credit default swaps market 
(Hull, Predescu, and White (2004); Norden and Weber (2004)), the currency market and the 
sovereign debt market (Reinhart (2002); Sy (2004)). Thus, credit rating agencies have faced such 
criticism long before the 2007-2008 financial crisis.   
The difficulty of rating agencies to convey timely default information to the market is a 
deep-rooted problem for several reasons.  First, rating agencies may not have timely or accurate 
information on debt issuers’ financial positions (Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000)), or 
                                                 
18For instance, in response to the failure of Enron in December 2001, the Senate criticized 
credit rating agencies for not downgrading the company’s debt rating soon enough.  The Staff 
Report of the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs indicated that the credit agencies’ 
monitoring and review of Enron’s finances “fell below the careful efforts one would have 
expected from organizations whose ratings hold so much importance”.   
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they may not use the best rating methodologies or expend maximum effort (Cheng and Neamtiu 
(2009)).  Second, while the financial positions of rated companies are constantly changing, the 
change in credit ratings can only be made periodically.  As a result, a lag of credit ratings in 
reflecting the changes in financial positions may be inevitable.  Third, default probability is a 
continuous variable, but credit ratings, which are indications of default likelihood, are discrete.  
A rating agency cannot make a rating change until the financial position of a company 
deteriorates to the next rating level.  As a result, rating changes may lag the change in bond 
issuer’s default probability.19 
Another reason for the slow reaction may be related to an argument put forth by rating 
agencies that markets expect stable ratings.  Ratings are often used by investors and regulators as 
guidance for portfolio governance.20  Frequent changes in ratings may force portfolio managers 
to trade securities more frequently, thereby increasing transaction costs.  Frequent rating changes 
may also force portfolio managers to sell securities at lower prices (when they are downgraded) 
and to purchase at higher prices (when they are upgraded) more frequently and thus suffering 
more losses.  Consequently, rating agencies tend to meet the market expectations by making 
rating changes only when a reversal in ratings in the near future is unlikely (Cantor (2001); 
Cantor and Mann (2007)).  Studies in the literature also show that the policy of issuing stable 
                                                 
19
 Both Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s have adopted refined rating 
categories by adding modifiers (e.g. “+” and “-”, or “1”, “2”, and “3”) to the generic rating 
categories to indicate whether a bond is on the upper, middle, or lower end of the rating category.  
The refinement of the rating categories can be viewed as a step moving from a discrete rating 
system toward a continuous spectrum.  So refined ratings not only reflect the default probability 
more precisely, they also may trigger a rating change more quickly as rating agencies do not 
have to wait until the financial positions of bond issuers to deteriorate (or improve) to the next 
broader generic rating category to make rating changes.   
20
 For instance, financial institutions such as banks and pension funds are often required to hold 
“investment grade” bonds only in order to show their “prudence” in fund management.  As a 
result, when a bond is downgraded to “speculative grade”, they must sell the bond at a loss.  
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ratings allows rating agencies to focus on bond issuers’ permanent, long-term and structural 
credit risk, rather than the short-term and temporary credit risk (Altman and Rijken (2004)).21 
Loffler (2005), however, argues such a policy of stable ratings may lead to a lag of rating 
changes behind the true changes in bond issuer’s default risk.   While investors may have some 
expectation of rating stability, they also expect rating agencies to make changes in a timely 
fashion.  If rating agencies sacrifice timeliness for the sake of stability, markets may work faster 
than the rating agency and price in much of information about the changing default risk of the 
firm before a rating change occurs.   Undoubtedly, investors would benefit from timely rating 
changes, especially during financial crises when investors are urgently seeking new information 
about the default risk of a firm.  
Credit rating agencies have not been insensitive to the criticism.  One specific action by 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P’s) was the creation in of a service known as CreditWatch, which was 
first offered in November 1981.  CreditWatch provides information to investors about potential 
changes in default risk prior to an actual change in rating.  One major purpose of CreditWatch is 
to ease the tension between the market expectation of rating stability and the market demand for 
rating timeliness (Altman and Rijken (2006)). 
When a company is listed on CreditWatch, it is typically listed with either a positive or a 
negative potential.22  In a listing with positive potential, the rating of the company will usually be 
                                                 
21
 Standard & Poor’s (2003) indicates that the value of its rating products is greatest “when its 
ratings focus on the long-term and do not fluctuate with short-term performance.”  Similarly, 
Moody’s Investors Service makes rating changes “only when it believes an issuer has 
experienced what is likely to be an enduring change in fundamental credit worthiness” (Cantor 
and Mann, October 2003). 
22
 Infrequently, Standard & Poor’s will place a company on the CreditWatch list under a third 
category known as “developing.”  When a company is listed as “developing”, it means the credit 
rating of the company is likely to be changed, but the direction of the change is unknown.  The 
number of companies listed as “developing” is far less than the number of companies listed with 
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eventually upgraded or affirmed (i.e. unchanged), and the rating is rarely downgraded.  Similarly, 
in a listing with negative potential, the rating of the company will usually be eventually 
downgraded or affirmed, and the rating is rarely upgraded.  Once the rating is changed or 
affirmed, the listed company is delisted (removed) from the CreditWatch list.  Unlike credit 
rating changes in which rating agencies convey the default risk to the market in one action (i.e. 
the rating change), the publication of CreditWatch conveys the default information to the market 
through two sequential actions – first through listing, and then through delisting.  The listing 
conveys information about the direction of the rating change, and the delisting reveals the 
magnitude of the actual rating change.  Although listing on CreditWatch can lead to a bond 
rating change, only a small fraction of all actual rating changes are preceded by a listing on 
CreditWatch. 
In this study, we examine the response of equity prices of firms listed and delisted from 
CreditWatch to determine if it improves the timeliness of rating changes.  We choose to examine 
the reaction of equity markets (instead of debt markets) because equity investors have the most 
to lose from default, so prices in equity markets are more sensitive to changes in default risk.  
Equity markets are also considerably more liquid than bond markets and the data for equity 
prices are readily available.  Moreover, Wansley and Clauretie (1985) examine the reaction of 
both equity and bond markets to CreditWatch events, and conclude that bond markets are 
considerably less efficient than equity markets. 
   Despite its intended purpose of informing investors of a potential rating change in a timely 
fashion, we find that CreditWatch does not completely achieve this goal.  We report three 
empirical results in support of this conclusion.  First, we find equity markets experience 
                                                                                                                                                             
positive or negative potentials.  We do not include bonds listed as “developing” in our study. 
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substantial positive (negative) reaction to the listing of companies with positive (negative) 
potential on CreditWatch prior to the actual date of listing. Second, equity markets exhibit little 
reaction to the delisting of a company from CreditWatch, even when the delisting is 
accompanied by a change in rating.  Third, we find that the pre-listing abnormal returns in equity 
markets are good predictors of both the direction and the magnitude of the eventual change in 
credit rating.  Collectively, our findings suggest that rating agencies may sacrifice timeliness for 
the sake of stability and that even CreditWatch, which is designed to mitigate the disadvantage 
caused by stable rating policies, is not a completely effective instrument.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I discusses the data and the 
methodology. Section II presents the empirical analyses and results, and Section III concludes. 
B. Data and Methodology 
B.1 Sample Construction and Description 
  Our sample construction begins with firms placed on CreditWatch between January 2002 
and December 2005.  We hand-collect the following data: 1) company name, 2) listing date, 3) 
existing S&P senior debt rating, 4) listing potential, and 5) new S&P senior debt rating after 
delisting.  From this group, we exclude all firms with insufficient data from the Center in 
Research and Security Prices (CRSP) to compute abnormal returns surrounding the listing date.  
We also exclude firms for which definitive information about the action taken by S&P regarding 
the firms’ rating upon delisting is unavailable.  The final sample consists of 604 observations, 
with 101 listed with “positive” potential, 503 listed with “negative” potential.23  The sample 
                                                 
23
 There is one (five) extremely rare cases in which firms were listed with positive (negative) 
potentials but were downgraded (upgraded).  We report these observations in our descriptive 
statistics, but exclude them from further analysis.  
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composition is consistent with similar studies in the literature (e.g. Dichev and Piotroski (2001); 
Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992); Holthausen, and Leftwich (1986)) in that downgrades 
are considerably more common than upgrades.    
  Following Morgan (2002), we transform letter ratings into a numerical scale with higher 
quality ratings transformed into lower numbers.  The details of the transformation are provided 
in Appendix I.  Tables 1 and 2 report the frequency distributions of the initial rating and the new 
rating upon delisting for companies listed with “positive” and “negative” potentials, respectively.  
For listings with positive potential, approximately 80% of firms are upgraded when delisted from 
CreditWatch.  For firms listed with negative potential, approximately 60% are downgraded when 
delisted. 
  Table 3 reports basic financial characteristics of the firms in the sample categorized by type 
of listing.  Financial data is obtained from Compustat for the year preceding the date of listing.  
The sample sizes are reduced slightly because of missing data in Compustat.  Statistically 
significant differences exist regarding the size of the companies (measured by total assets) and 
the cash ratio.  Specifically, firms listed with negative potential are larger in size and have lower 
cash ratios compared to firms listed with positive potential.   Firms listed with positive potential 
tend to remain on the CreditWatch list longer than those listed with negative potential, but the 
difference is not statistically significant.  A breakdown of the number of firms by the first digit of 
the Compustat SIC code is provided in Appendix II. 
B.2  Methodology 
To capture the reaction of the equity market, we employ an event study methodology by 
computing daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the 
companies in event windows surrounding the listing and delisting dates.  For robustness, we 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of CreditWatch Listings with Positive Potential 
 
This table summarizes the frequency distribution by ratings of companies that were listed on the CreditWatch with “positive” potential 
between January 2002 and December 2005.  The credit ratings on the very left column are the original ratings of companies 
immediately before the CreditWatch listing.  The ratings on the top row are the new ratings after the removal (delisting) from the 
CreditWatch list. Ratings on the diagonal are companies whose ratings remain unchanged.  Since this table contains only firms listed 
with “positive” potential, all the companies ended with rating upgrades (below the diagonal) or unchanged (on the diagonal) except 
one company (which was lowered from B+ to B-).  
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AAA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
AA+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AA- 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
A+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A- 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
BBB+ 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
BBB 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
BBB- 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
BB+ 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
BB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
BB- 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 9 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
B+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 9 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
B- 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 
CCC+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CCC- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
CC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1 0 2 1 2 4 9 11 9 7 6 16 15 11 2 4 0 0 0 1 0 101 
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Table 2: Summary of CreditWatch Listings with Negative Potential 
 
This table summarizes the frequency distribution by ratings of companies that were listed on the CreditWatch with “negative” 
potential between January 2002 and December 2005.  The credit ratings on the very left column are the original ratings of companies 
immediately before the CreditWatch listing.  The ratings on the top row are the new ratings after the removal (delisting) from the 
CreditWatch list.  Ratings on the diagonal are companies whose ratings remain unchanged.  Since this table contains only firms listed 
with “negative” potential, with the exception of five cases, all the companies ended with rating downgrades (above the diagonal) or 
unchanged (on the diagonal). 
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AAA 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
AA+ 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
AA 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
AA- 0 0 0 3 8 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
A+ 0 0 0 0 6 9 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
A 0 0 0 0 0 9 18 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 
A- 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 11 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 
BBB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 14 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 
BBB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 23 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 
BBB- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 26 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 
BB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 20 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 
BB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 28 11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 
BB- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 21 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 
B+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 12 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 38 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 3 7 3 0 1 0 0 23 
B- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 2 0 0 0 9 
CCC+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 5 
CCC- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 5 
CC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 4 9 
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 0 3 3 5 15 19 46 32 38 53 43 52 55 55 27 16 12 6 7 8 0 8 503 
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Table 3: Financial Characteristics of Firms Listed on CreditWatch 
 
This table presents basic financial characteristics of the sample firms for the year prior to being 
listed on CreditWatch.  Total Assets are presented in millions of dollars.  ROA is computed as 
net income divided by total assets.  The Debt Ratio is computed as total liabilities divided by 
total assets.  The Cash Ratio is cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets.   The days 
between listing and delisting is the number of calendar days between the listing and delisting 
dates.  *, **, *** denotes statistically different from zero based on a standard t-test for the means 
and a Wilcoxon test for the medians at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Total Assets ($MM) ROA (%) Debt Ratio (%) Cash Ratio (%) 
Days Between 
Listing and 
Delisting 
 
 
Firms with Positive Potentials 
 Mean 12,754 -4.05% 72.87% 10.90% 116.2 
P
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
 5th 461 -33.61 31.52 0.97 16.0 
25th 1,387 -1.92 55.77 3.30 36.0 
Median 3,171 1.80 71.22 7.45 96.5 
75th 10,623 5.42 88.82 12.04 157.5 
95th 63,667 10.60 109.67 31.64 291.0 
 Std. Dev. 22,298 32.82 29.09 12.22 91.2 
 N 97 97 97 97 100 
 
 
Firms with Negative Potentials 
 Mean 25,600 -0.47% 69.60% 8.60% 102.1 
P
e
rc
e
n
ti
le
 5th 611 -22.41 39.71 0.34 22.0 
25th 2,074 -2.35 55.81 1.76 44.0 
Median 6,143 1.69 67.83 4.74 73.5 
75th 16,604 4.56 82.37 11.44 134.0 
95th 103,914 11.31 102.08 28.31 275.0 
 Std. Dev. 83,588 12.64 19.86 10.73 88.3 
 N 486 486 486 486 498 
 Differenc
e of 
Means  -12,846*** -3.58 3.27 2.30* 14.1 
 Differenc
e of 
Medians -13,433*** 0.11 6.66 2.71*** 23.0 
 
 
consider three estimation procedures – the market model, market adjusted return model, and the 
Fama-French (1992) model – to calculate the abnormal returns.  The market index is the CRSP 
value-weighted index and the daily Fama-French factors are also obtained from CRSP.  The 
estimation period is the 200 trading days ending 61 trading days prior to the event date.  The 
market model is specified as a single factor model with the rate of return of a common stock as a 
function of the return of a market index: 
 Rjt = αj + βj Rmt + εjt   (1)  
Where Rjtis the rate of return of the common stock of firm j on day t; Rmtis the rate of return of a 
market index on day t; εjtis the error term -- a random variable that, by construction, must have 
an expected value of zero, and is assumed to be uncorrelated with Rmt.  The coefficient βj is a 
parameter that measures the sensitivity of Rjt to the market index.  
  Market model abnormal return (or prediction error) for the common stock of the firm j on 
day t,ARjt is defined as:  
          ARjt = Rjt − ( jαˆ + jˆβ Rmt)   (2) 
where the coefficients jαˆ and jˆβ  are ordinary least squares estimates of αj and βj.   
The market adjusted return model computes abnormal returns by simply subtracting the 
observed return on the market index from the rate of return of the common stock: 
                                ARjt= Rjt− Rmt    (3) 
  The Fama-French (1992) three-factor model states that security prices are determined by 
three factors, defined as: 
                 ERjt = αj + βj ERmt + SjSMBt+ hjHMLt + εjt. (4) 
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where ERjt is the excess rate of return of the common stock beyond the risk-free rate of firm j on 
day t; ERmt is the excess return of the market index beyond the risk-free rate on day t; SMBt is the 
average return on small market-capitalization portfolios minus the average return on three large 
market-capitalization portfolios;  HMLt is the average return on two high book-to-market equity 
portfolios minus the average return on two low book-to-market equity portfolios; εjt is the error 
term.   The abnormal return (or prediction error) for the common stock of firm j on day t is 
computed as: 
       ARjt = ERjt − ( jαˆ  + jˆβ ERmt + jSˆ SMBt + jhˆ HMLt)  (5) 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns are the sum of daily abnormal returns over a specified time 
period.  For all three models, the CAR from trading day T1 through T2 is computed for firm j as: 
                 CAR j,(T 1 T 2 )=∑
=
2
1
T
Tt
jtAR .     (6) 
whereT1and T2are the beginning and ending days of the event window, respectively.  
C. Empirical Results 
Our goal in this paper is evaluating the ability of CreditWatch to convey information to 
markets in a timely fashion.  Accordingly, we examine the equity market’s reaction to both the 
listing on and delisting from CreditWatch.  We also examine to what extent the rating action that 
occurs upon delisting (i.e. an affirmed rating or a change in rating) is reflected in the abnormal 
returns. 
C.1    Equity Market Reaction to CreditWatch Listing 
To assess whether CreditWatch listings reflect the changes of the listed companies’ 
financial positions in a timely fashion, we calculate the daily AR on days surrounding the date of 
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listing and the CAR for several event windows.  For robustness, we use three different return 
generating models, as described in the previous section.  Separate results of the mean values for 
listings with positive and negative potential are presented in Table 4. 
Analysis of the daily AR shows a significant positive (negative) reaction by the market on 
the day of a listing (Day 0) with positive (negative) potential.  Taken alone, this finding suggests 
that a listing on CreditWatch provides the market with new information.  However, the 
magnitude of the reaction on the day of listing is often substantially smaller than the CAR 
present in the days prior to the listing date, suggesting the listing on CreditWatch is somewhat 
delayed.  This trend is particularly pronounced for those firms listed with negative potential.  For 
example, the market adjusted model abnormal return on Day 0 is -2.84%, but CAR(-30,-1) is nearly 
three times as large at -8.20%. 
Although the abnormal returns are both statistically and economically significant on the 
listing day, we cannot conclude whether the return on the listing day was due to the 
announcement of the CreditWatch list, or it is part of the continuing adjustment process that may 
have started as early as 60 days before the listing.  Even if the significant abnormal return on the 
listing day is entirely related to the announcement of the listing, the results still indicate the 
placement of firms on CreditWatch may not be timely enough.  Regardless of the specification 
for computing abnormal returns (the market model, market adjusted return model, or the Fama-
French model), the results in Table 4 suggest that equity markets have reflected a substantial 
portion of the change in listed firms’ financial positions before the listing day.  For robustness, 
we also examine the median values of the daily AR and CAR, and the results (unreported) 
confirm the findings of the analysis using the value of the means. 
We next examine the equity market reaction surrounding the listing date categorized by the 
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delisting action.  We classify the listed companies into four categories based on the magnitude of 
the actual change in rating that occurs on the delisting day.  The four categories are: no rating 
change (i.e. rating being affirmed), a small rating change (changed by one notch), a medium 
rating change (changed by two notches), and a large rating change (changed by three notches or 
more).  The subcategories are further separated for companies listed with positive and negative 
potential, creating a total of eight possible categories.   
   The mean daily AR and CAR over various event windows surrounding the listing date for 
each category are presented in Table 5.  To conserve space, we report only the results from the 
market model estimation throughout the remainder of the paper, but both the market adjusted 
return model and the Fama-French models produces results qualitatively similar to those from 
the market model. 
The results in Table 5 provide considerable evidence suggesting a positive correlation 
between the magnitude of the CARs prior to the listing day and the magnitude of the rating 
changes announced on the delisting day.  For positively listed companies, the magnitude of the 
CARs prior to the listing day does not monotonically increase with the magnitude of rating 
changes, but we find the average magnitude of the CARs for companies within the two smallest 
rating change categories (i.e. companies whose ratings were affirmed or were changed by one 
notch) are smaller than the CARs for companies with two larger rating change categories (i.e. 
companies whose ratings were changed by two notches or three notches or more).    
For companies listed with negative potentials (which is a much larger sample compared to 
the listings with positive potential), the evidence is much stronger.  The magnitude of the CAR 
prior to the listing, regardless of the event window, exhibits a consistent monotonic trend.  This 
is strong evidence that equity markets have anticipated prior to the listing date not only  
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Table 4: Equity Market Reaction to CreditWatch Listing 
 
This table presents the mean values of the daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) over various event windows surrounding the listing day on CreditWatch.  Results 
are presented separately based on the expected rating change potential (positive or negative) at 
the time of listing.  The AR and CAR are calculated using three models as described in Section I:  
the market model (MKT), the market adjusted return model (MADJ), and the Fama-French 3-
factor model (FF).  *, **, *** denotes statistically different from zero based on a Patell z-test at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
AR Firms with Positive Potentials Firms with Negative Potentials 
Day  
MKT 
Model 
MADJ 
Model 
FF 
Model   
MKT 
Model 
MADJ 
Model 
FF 
Model 
-7 0.08% 0.26% 0.11% -0.28% ** -0.31% ** -0.26% 
-6 -0.07% -0.01% -0.11% -0.32% *** -0.38% *** -0.32% *** 
-5 0.15% 0.39% 0.09% -0.76% *** -0.77% *** -0.69% 
-4 0.34% * 0.43% ** 0.36% -0.24% * -0.32% ** -0.24% 
-3 0.78% *** 0.78% *** 0.70% ** -0.21% * -0.24% * -0.21% *** 
-2 0.20% ** 0.34% *** 0.11% ** -0.75% *** -0.82% *** -0.68% ** 
-1 -0.10% 0.13% -0.12% -1.41% *** -1.46% *** -1.40% *** 
0 2.71% *** 2.79% *** 2.67% ** -2.83% *** -2.84% *** -2.86% *** 
1 0.18% 0.27% 0.26% * -1.14% *** -1.18% *** -1.11% *** 
2 0.01% 0.09% 0.03% -0.24% ** -0.26% ** -0.27% ** 
3 -0.05% 0.03% 0.01% 0.25% * 0.20%   0.28%   
CAR Firms with Positive Potentials Firms with Negative Potentials 
Days  
MKT 
Model 
MADJ 
Model 
FF 
Model   
MKT 
Model 
MADJ 
Model 
FF 
Model 
(-60, -1) 3.78% *** 10.01% *** 2.89% ** -7.11% *** -10.82% *** -7.08% *** 
(-30, -1) 1.64% ** 4.85% *** 1.37% * -6.23% *** -8.20% *** -5.95% *** 
(-7,-1)  1.39% *** 2.32% *** 1.16%   -3.97% *** -4.32% *** -3.80% *** 
 (0,0)    2.71% *** 2.79% *** 2.67% ** -2.83% *** -2.84% *** -2.86% *** 
 (+1,+3)  0.13%   0.40%   0.29%   -1.13% *** -1.24% *** -1.10% ** 
N 101   101   101   503   503   503   
  
theCreditWatch listing potential (positive or negative), but also the change in rating at delisting.  
This point is well-illustrated in Figure 1, which plots CAR(-7,+3) for the eight categories.  Despite 
some notable reaction on the day of announcement, the adjustment process in equity prices 
begins well before then, particularly for listings that ultimately result in rating changes of at least 
two notches.  The results suggest that CreditWatch is still not timely enough in conveying the 
  
Table 5: Equity Market Reaction to CreditWatch Listing Categorized by Delisting Action 
 
This table presents the mean values of daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over various event 
windows surrounding the listing date on CreditWatch categorized by the change in rating that occurs when the firm is delisted.  
The AR and CAR are computed using the market model as described in Section I.  The sample size is reduced because firms 
delisted with rating changes in an opposite direction of the initial listing are excluded from analysis.  Separate results are 
presented for firms listed with positive and negative potential.  Within the categories of positive (negative) potential, results are 
further classified by the magnitude of delisting action:  affirmed with no change in rating, up (down) by one notch, up (down) 
by two notches, or up (down) by three or more notches.  Abnormal returns generated by both the market adjusted return model 
and Fama-French 3-factor model produce qualitatively similar results and are not reported.  *, **, *** denotes statistically 
different from zero based on a Patell z-test at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
AR Positive Negative 
Day Affirmed   
Up 
1 Notch 
  
Up 
2 Notches 
  
Up 3+ 
Notches 
  Affirmed   
Down 
1 Notch 
  
Down 
2 
Notches 
  
Down 3+ 
Notches 
  
-7 0.66% 0.14% -0.17% -0.76%   -0.07% -0.25% * -0.88% ** -0.21% 
-6 -0.32% -0.12% -0.55% 0.77%   -0.29% ** -0.12% 
 
-1.53% *** 0.39% 
-5 -0.06% 0.09% 0.90% * 0.16%   -0.13% -0.86% *** -1.61% *** -1.18% * 
-4 0.02% 0.01% 2.42% *** 0.35%   -0.02% -0.46% *** -0.03% 
 
-0.23% 
-3 0.55% 0.34% * 3.91% *** 0.31%   0.14% -0.29% ** -0.34% -1.13% 
-2 -0.24% 0.00% -0.42% 1.75% *** -0.54% *** -0.17% ** -1.13% *** -4.17% *** 
-1 0.19% -0.68% * 1.41% *** 0.49%   -0.87% *** -1.74% *** -1.05% *** -3.20% *** 
0 4.84% *** 0.07% ** 4.24% *** 8.94% *** -0.65% ** -3.74% *** -2.89% *** -8.63% *** 
1 0.48% 0.17% -0.11% 0.00%   -0.78% *** -0.80% *** -1.43% *** -3.95% *** 
2 -0.14% -0.18% 1.34% ** 0.04%   -0.29% -0.45% *** -0.30% 
 
0.95% 
3 -0.77% 0.22% 0.23% -0.30%   0.07% 0.03% 0.53% * 1.51% ** 
CAR Positive Negative 
Day Affirmed   
Up 
1 Notch 
  
Up 
2 Notches 
  
Up 3+ 
Notches 
  Affirmed   
Down 
1 Notch 
  
Down 
2 
Notches 
  
Down 3+ 
Notches 
  
(-60, -1) 7.53% * -0.48% 11.02% *** 6.36% * -1.83% *** -7.68% *** -12.66% *** -23.69% *** 
(-30, -1) 5.53% 
 
-1.94% 9.84% *** 3.01% 
 
-2.08% *** -7.09% *** -10.70% *** -18.20% *** 
(-7,-1)  0.80% -0.23% 7.51% *** 3.07% ** -1.78% *** -3.88% *** -6.58% *** -9.72% *** 
 (0,0)    4.84% *** 0.07% ** 4.24% *** 8.94% *** -0.65% ** -3.74% *** -2.89% *** -8.63% *** 
 (+1,+3)  -0.44% 0.21%   1.46%   -0.26%   -0.99% *** -1.22% *** -1.19% ** -1.50% *** 
N 20   55   11   14   193   199   68   38   
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information about the change of financial positions of listed firms to the market. 
C.2    Equity Market Reaction to CreditWatch Delisting 
Having provided evidence that the magnitude of the rating change at delisting is reflected 
in equity prices prior to the listing announcement, we next examine the information content of 
the delisting event by computing the AR and CAR surrounding the date of delisting.  Table 6 
presents the daily AR and CAR over various event windows surrounding the delisting date by 
the type of action that occurs when the company is delisted from CreditWatch.   We take care to 
ensure that none of the pre-delisting windows overlap with post-listing windows.  The results in 
Table 6 are noticeably different from those presented in Table 5 for the listing date, as there is 
very little market reaction on the day of the delisting announcement (Day 0).  This is true 
regardless of whether the firm was listed with positive or negative potential, and also irrespective 
of the magnitude of the rating change upon delisting.  The results suggest that the announcement 
of delisting (in which the actual rating changes are made) contains limited information. C.3    
Predicting the Change in Rating 
We have shown equity markets experience significant reactions in the days prior to  
a firm’s listing day.  We have also shown markets exhibit little reaction on the day a firm is 
delisted from CreditWatch.  We now examine whether the pre-listing equity market reaction is 
an effective predictor of the eventual change in rating upon delisting.  If it is, then CreditWatch 
is too slow in reflecting the changes in the firms’ financial positions.  
While the results in Table 5 and Figure 1 suggest that pre-listing CARs may serve as good 
predictors of rating changes, we now provide additional statistical support.  To ascertain the 
degree of statistical significance, we regress the magnitude of the rating change at delisting on 
the CARs from the listing period using OLS estimation.  Recall that higher rated bonds receive 
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lower numerical scores, so an upgrade (downgrade) results in a negative (positive) value for the 
dependent variable.  The results for several specifications of this model are presented in Table 7. 
Model 1 contains only the CARs from the listing period as independent variables.24  The 
CARs for both the pre-listing (LIST_CAR (-7,-1)) and listing date (LIST_CAR(0,0)) are 
negative and statistically significant, and an F-test for the equality of coefficients shows that the 
magnitude of the listing date CAR is significantly greater.  This suggests that the announcement 
day contains significantly more information than the pre-listing period.  However, the inclusion 
of additional control variables eliminates this statistical difference.  
Model 2 adds control variables for the time between the listing and delisting dates (SPAN) 
and the initial numerical rating at the time of listing (LIST_RATING).  We also include dummy 
variables to control for proximity to the threshold between investment-grade and speculative-
grade (junk) status.  A bond rating of BB+ and below is considered junk status.   Prior research 
(e.g. Brister, Kennedy, and Liu (1994); Jorion and Zhang (2007)) has demonstrated movement 
into or out of junk status has a more pronounced impact on markets since many institutional 
investors are prohibited from holding junk bonds.  NEAR_JUNK takes a value of one for 
negatively listed firms with an initial rating of BBB+, BBB, or BBB-. NEAR_JUNK bonds are 
most likely to be downgraded into the junk bond categories upon delisting.  Similarly, 
NEAR_INVESTMENT takes a value of one for positively listed firms with an initial rating of 
BB+, BB, or BB-.  NEAR_INVESTMENT bonds are most likely to be upgraded into 
investment-grade categories upon delisting. The addition of these two dummy variables reduce 
the magnitude of LIST_CAR(0,0), but both LIST_CAR(-7,-1) and LIST_CAR(0,0) retain 
                                                 
24
 We also consider the CARs surrounding the delisting date as independent variables in our 
regression models.  These variables never achieved statistical significance and appear to have no 
relationship with the magnitude of the rating change, so we do not report them.  
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 Figure 1:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding the Listing Date Categorized by Delisting Action 
 
This figure presents the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the listing date (defined at t = 0) from seven days 
before to three days after the listing day (-7,+3), categorized by the delisting action.  POS_AFF is listed with positive potential 
followed by rating affirmation (i.e. unchanged) upon delisting.  POS_UP1, POS_UP2, and POS_UP3+ are listed with positive 
potential followed by upgrade of 1, 2, and 3 or more notches, respectively, upon delisting.  NEG_AFF is listed with negative potential 
followed by rating affirmation upon delisting.  NEG_DOWN1, NEG_DOWN2, and NEG_DOWN3+ are listed with negative potential 
followed by downgrade of 1, 2, and 3 or more notches, respectively, upon delisting. 
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Figure 1:  CAR Surrounding Listing Date Categorized by Delisting 
Action
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Table 6: Equity Market Reaction to CreditWatch Delisting 
 
This table presents the mean values of daily abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over various event 
windows surrounding the date of delisting from CreditWatch.  The AR and CAR are computed using the market model as described in 
Section I.  The sample size is reduced because firms delisted with rating changes in an opposite direction of the initial listing are 
excluded from analysis.  Separate results are presented for firms listed with positive and negative potential.  Within the categories of 
positive (negative) potential, results are further classified by the magnitude of delisting action:  affirmed with no change in rating, up 
(down) by one notch, up (down) by two notches, or up (down) by three or more notches.  Abnormal returns generated by both the 
market adjusted return model and Fama-French 3-factor model produce qualitatively similar results and are not reported.  *, **, *** 
denotes statistically different from zero based on a standard t-test at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
AR Firms Listed with Positive Potential Firms Listed with Negative Potential 
Day Affirmed   
Up 
1 Notch 
  
Up 
2 Notches 
  
Up 3+ 
Notches 
  Affirmed   
Down 
1 Notch 
  
Down 
2 Notches 
  
Down 3+ 
Notches 
  
-7 -3.31% *** -0.58% 
 
0.23% 
 
-1.53%   0.01% 
 
-0.37% * -1.49% *** 4.95% *** 
-6 1.04% ** 0.18% * -0.49% 
 
-1.66% * 0.22% 
 
-0.42% 
 
-2.07% *** 1.05% *** 
-5 -0.93% *** -1.01% ** -0.53% 
 
-0.98%   -0.15% 
 
-0.13% 
 
0.43% 
 
-1.22% ** 
-4 -0.34% 
 
0.63% 
 
0.24% 
 
-0.55%   0.19% 
 
0.59% * 0.33% 
 
0.84% 
 -3 0.10% 
 
-0.42% 
 
-0.38% 
 
-0.43%   0.11% 
 
0.57% * -0.85% ** 0.57% ** 
-2 -0.20% 
 
0.29% 
 
0.18% 
 
-1.84%   0.26% 
 
-0.01% 
 
0.01% 
 
-2.98% *** 
-1 -0.03% 
 
-0.16% 
 
-1.48% * 1.18%   0.04% 
 
0.35% * 0.15% 
 
-0.87% 
 0 -0.55% 
 
-0.62% ** 0.65% 
 
-0.36%   0.28% 
 
-0.07% 
 
1.04% *** -1.49% *** 
1 0.56% 
 
0.50% * 0.64% 
 
0.39%   0.10% 
 
0.16% 
 
-0.69% ** 0.94% ** 
2 -0.26% 
 
1.37% * -1.72% ** -0.46%   0.13% 
 
0.22% 
 
-0.24% 
 
0.12% 
 3 0.07% 
 
0.17% 
 
-0.19% 
 
-0.42%   0.22% 
 
0.47% ** -1.26% ** 2.29% *** 
CAR Firms Listed with Positive Potential Firms Listed with Negative Potential 
Day Affirmed   
Up 
1 Notch 
  
Up 
2 Notches 
  
Up 3+ 
Notches 
  Affirmed   
Down 
1 Notch 
  
Down 
2 Notches 
  
Down 3+ 
Notches 
  
(-7,-1)  -3.66% *** -1.07% 
 
-2.23% 
 
-5.82% * 0.68% * 0.59% 
 
-3.50% ** 2.35% 
  (0,0)    -0.55% 
 
-0.62% ** 0.65% 
 
-0.36%   0.28% 
 
-0.07% 
 
1.04% ** -1.49% *** 
 (+1,+3)  0.37% 
 
2.05% * -1.27% 
 
-0.49%   0.44% 
 
0.85% * -2.16% ** 3.35% *** 
N 19   49   8   6   191   196   63   32   
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Table 7: Predicting the Magnitude of Rating Change at Delisting 
 
This table presents results of regressing rating changes at delisting on the CAR surrounding the listing date and other control variables.  
The dependent variable in all models is the numerical change in rating that occurs upon delisting from CreditWatch.  An upgrade 
(downgrade) is reflected by a negative (positive) number.  LIST_CAR(T1,T2) is the CAR computed using the market model from days 
T1 to T2 relative to the day listed on CreditWatch.  SPAN is the number of days between listing and delisting.  LIST_RATING is the 
numerical rating at the time of listing.  NEAR_JUNK is a dummy variable equal to one for negatively listed firms with an initial rating 
of BBB+, BBB, or BBB-.  NEAR_INVESTMENT is a dummy variable equal to one for positively listed firms with an initial rating of 
BB+, BB, or BB-.  Financial variables are from the fiscal year ending prior to the listing date:  LN(ASSETS) is the natural log of total 
assets, ROA is net income divided by total assets, DEBT_RATIO is total liabilities divided by total assets, CASH_RATIO is cash and 
equivalents divided by total assets.  ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: Rating Change 
Both Positive and Negative Positive Negative 
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4)OLS (5) Tobit (6) Tobit 
Intercept 0.426 *** 0.991 *** 0.993 *** 1.618 *** 1.905 *** -0.330 
 
LIST_CAR(-7,-1) -1.604 *** -1.644 *** -1.863 *** -1.515 *** -1.345 *** -1.248 ** 
LIST_CAR(0,0) -3.006 *** -2.456 *** -2.445 *** -2.151 *** -2.076 *** -1.987 *** 
LIST_CAR(+1,+3) 0.177 
 
0.284 
 
0.282 
 
0.278   0.171 
 
-0.511 
 
 
  
      
  
  
  
 
SPAN   
 
-0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 
 
LIST_RATING   
 
-0.030 ** -0.031 ** -0.035 * -0.048 ** -0.032 
 
 
  
      
  
  
  
 
NEAR_JUNK   
 
0.253 ** 0.294 ** 0.310 ** 
  
0.383 *** 
NEAR_INVESTMENT   
 
-1.806 *** -1.837 *** -1.848 *** -2.944 ***   
 
LIST_CAR(-7,-1)* NEAR_JUNK   
   
1.660 * 2.066 ** 
  
1.271 
 
LIST_CAR(-7,-1)* NEAR_INVESTMENT   
   
-3.033 
 
-2.827   -1.746 
 
  
 
 
  
      
  
  
  
 
LN(ASSETS)   
     
-0.013   -0.009 
 
-0.002 
 
ROA   
     
-0.305   -0.312 
 
-0.025 
 
DEBT_RATIO   
     
-0.103   -0.245 
 
-0.044 
 
CASH_RATIO   
     
0.276   -0.080 
 
0.051 
 
Year Dummy No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes   Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
  
      
  
  
  
 
R-Square     0.087 
 
0.194 
 
0.209 
 
0.217   0.470 
 
       0.340 
 
F-value          19.93 *** 21.58 *** 17.24 *** 11.1 *** 
  
  
 
Log Likelihood Ratio Statistics 
N 
 
598  
 
598  
 
598  
 
583 
  
243.96           
583 
*** 1241.21     
583 
*** 
 
  
      
  
  
  
 
Equality of Coefficients (F-test) Difference Difference Difference Difference Difference Difference 
H0:LIST_CAR(-7,-1) = LIST_CAR(0,0) 1.402 *** 0.812   0.582   0.636   
       
0.731  
      0.739 
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statistical significance. Model 3 includes an interaction of the dummy variables NEAR_JUNK 
and NEAR_INVESTMENT with LIST_CAR(-7,-1).   The interaction of LIST_CAR(-7,-1) with 
NEAR_JUNK is positive and significant. 
Model 4 adds basic financial characteristics of the listed firms as control variables.  We 
include the natural log of assets, LN(ASSETS), as measure of size, ROA as a measure of 
profitability, DEBT_RATIO as a measure of leverage, and CASH_RATIO as a measure of 
liquidity, but none of the variables have a statistically significant impact on the magnitude of the 
rating change. 
As a robustness check, Models 5 and 6 repeat the variable structure of Model 4, but 
separate the observations into categories of positive and negative potentials, respectively.  
Separating the sample into these two categories results in a truncation of the dependent variable 
(i.e. the change in rating), so we estimate Models 5 and 6 using a Tobit procedure.  The results 
for both Models 5 and 6 are consistent with the findings in Models 1 through 4.  The pre-listing 
and listing day CARs are statistically related to the change in rating upon delisting. 
To ascertain the economic significance of our results, consider the coefficient for 
LIST_CAR(-7,-1) in Model 4 of -1.515.  A one percentage point decline in the pre-listing CAR 
is associated with a rating downgrade of about 0.015 notches.  At first glance this may seem 
trivial, but the mean pre-listing CARs from Table 5 are substantially larger than 1%.  The fact 
that the pre-listing CARs are good predictors of rating changes upon delisting suggest that the 
CreditWatch is still too slow in reflecting the changes in firms’ financial positions.  
C.4    Robustness Checks 
Probit Model 
   As a robustness check, we perform ordered probit regressions using the same variable 
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structures as Models 1, 2 and 4 in Table 7.  The results are presented in Table 8, and confirm our 
previous findings.  Separate intercepts are reported for each magnitude of rating change.  The 
intercept values exhibit a monotonically increasing pattern.  Both LIST_CAR(-7,-1) and 
LIST_CAR(0,0) are again statistically significant, but of a lower magnitude relative to Table 7.  
This finding is not surprising given that the ordered probit procedure provides a specific intercept 
for each category of rating change, instead of a single intercept as in the OLS and Tobit 
procedures in Table 7.  The usefulness of pre- listing CARs in predicting the rating changes on 
the delisting date once again suggests that CreditWatch does not reflect the changes in the listed 
firms’ financial positions timely enough.  
Initial Bond Quality 
   Studies in the literature (e.g. Brister, Kennedy, and Liu, 1994; Jorion and Zhang, 2007) 
have shown that for the same magnitude of downgrade (e.g. downgrade by one notch), the 
impact on a low-grade bond (e.g. from B+ to B) tends to be greater than a high-grade bond (e.g. 
from A+ to A) because low-grade bonds are closer to bankruptcy and they are more scrutinized 
by investors and regulators.  As a robustness check of our on CreditWatch.  We choose the 
largest category with similar rating changes, the one notch downgrades, and construct three sub-
categories based on the initial rating: high ratings (A+), medium ratings (BBB), and low ratings 
(B+).   
   The results of the analysis are presented in Table 9, and demonstrate that the initial level of 
the rating is an important determinant of the magnitude of the CAR surrounding the CreditWatch 
results, we examine whether the same principles holds true for the CAR surrounding the listing  
listing date.  The magnitude of CARs during the pre-listing period increases monotonically as the 
credit level decreases.  For instance, the CARs over the period (-60, -1) are -2.19%, -8.97%, and  
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Table 8: Ordered Probit Model 
This table presents results of an ordered probit model that regresses rating changes at delisting on 
the CAR surrounding the listing date and other control variables.  The dependent variable in all 
models is the numerical change in rating that occurs upon delisting from CreditWatch.  An 
upgrade (downgrade) is reflected by a negative (positive) number.  LIST_CAR(T1,T2) is the 
CAR computed from days T1 to T2 relative to the day listed on CreditWatch.  SPAN is the 
number of days between listing and delisting.  LIST_RATING is the numerical rating at the time 
of listing.  NEAR_JUNK is a dummy variable equal to one for negatively listed firms with an 
initial rating of BBB+, BBB, or BBB-.  NEAR_INVESTMENT is a dummy variable equal to 
one for positively listed firms with an initial rating of BB+, BB, or BB-.  Financial variables are 
from the fiscal year ending prior to the listing date:  LN(ASSETS) is the natural log of total 
assets, ROA is net income divided by total assets, DEBT_RATIO is total liabilities divided by 
total assets, CASH_RATIO is cash and equivalents divided by total assets.  ***, **, * denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: Rating Change 
Ordered Probit 
(1) 
Ordered Probit 
(2) 
Ordered Probit 
(3) 
Intercepts:       
    Down 6 Notches -2.940 *** -2.555 *** -2.324 *** 
    Down 5 Notches -2.519 *** -2.141 *** -1.901 *** 
Down 4 Notches -2.050 *** -1.668 *** -1.424 *** 
Down 3 Notches -1.349 *** -0.961 *** -0.759 * 
Down 2 Notches -0.705 *** -0.313 * -0.084 
 Down 1 Notches 0.307 *** 0.735 *** 0.984 ** 
    Affirmed 1.450 *** 2.018 *** 2.276 *** 
    Up 1 Notches 2.109 *** 2.794 *** 3.087 *** 
Up2 Notches 2.387 *** 3.101 *** 3.390 *** 
Up 3 Notches 2.633 *** 3.377 *** 3.708 *** 
Up 4 Notches 2.752 *** 3.519 *** 3.884 *** 
Up5 Notches 2.911 *** 3.706 *** 4.145 *** 
Up 6 Notches 3.022 *** 3.843 ***     
Up 8 Notches 3.175 *** 4.037 *** 4.337 *** 
 
    
  
  
 LIST_CAR(-7,-1) -0.895 *** -0.963 *** -1.235 *** 
LIST_CAR(0,0) -1.818 *** -1.512 *** -1.473 *** 
LIST_CAR(1,3) 0.193   0.322 
 
0.115 
 
 
    
  
  
 SPAN     -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 
LIST_RATING     -0.022 * -0.029 ** 
 
    
  
  
 NEAR_JUNK     0.242 ** 0.291 *** 
NEAR_INVESTMENT     -1.458 *** -1.469 *** 
LIST_CAR(-7,-1)* NEAR_JUNK     
  
1.855 ** 
LIST_CAR(-7,-1)* NEAR_INVESTMENT     
  
0.494 
 
 
    
  
  
 LN(ASSETS)     
  
-0.009 
 ROA     
  
-0.217 
 DEBT_RATIO     
  
-0.106 
 CASH_RATIO     
  
0.124 
 Year Dummy  Yes   Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
    
  
  
 R-Square    0.11   0.22 
 
0.25 
 AIC           1909.38   1835.78 
 
1775.91 
 N 598   598 
 
583 
 
 
    
  
  
 Equality of Coefficients (F-test) Difference Difference Difference 
H0:LIST_CAR(-7,-1) = LIST_CAR(0,0) 0.923 * 0.549   0.238   
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Table 9: Reaction to One-Notch Downgrade based on Initial Bond Quality 
 
This table examines the effect of bond quality on the magnitude of daily abnormal returns (AR) 
and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over various event windows surrounding the listing date.  
Abnormal returns are computed using the market model (MKT) as described in Section I. 
Downgraded by one notch samples are decomposed into different subgroups according to their 
original listing position.  Variables are defined same as before. *, **, *** denotes statistically 
different from zero based on a standard t-test at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
AR Downgrade-by-One-Notch 
Day 
Downgrade from  
A+ to A 
  
Downgrade from 
BBB to BBB- 
  
Downgrade from  B+ 
to B 
  
-7 0.18% 
 
-0.58% * -1.00% 
 -6 -0.89% ** -0.74% -1.23% 
 -5 0.23% 
 
-0.67% 
 
-3.21% ** 
-4 -0.46% 
 
-0.91% ** -1.84% ** 
-3 -0.68% 
 
-0.64% -1.38% 
 -2 0.00% 
 
-0.28% 
 
2.96% * 
-1 -0.99% 
 
-1.92% *** -2.30% *** 
0 -2.67% *** -0.28% -8.69% *** 
1 -0.35% 
 
0.26% 
 
-3.17% *** 
2 -0.38% 
 
-0.81% ** 2.54% ** 
3 -0.85% * 0.33% 
 
4.54% *** 
CAR Downgrade-by-One-Notch 
Day 
Downgrade from A+ 
to A 
  
Downgrade from 
BBB to BBB- 
  
Downgrade from  B+ 
to B 
  
(-60, -1) -2.19% 
 
-8.97% *** -19.52% *** 
(-30, -1) -3.73% 
 
-7.91% *** -13.37% ** 
(-7,-1)  -2.62% * -5.74% *** -8.00% *** 
 (0,0)    -2.67% *** -0.28% 
 
-8.69% *** 
 (+1,+3)  -1.57% ** -0.22%   3.91%   
N. 10   23   12   
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-19.52% respectively for high rated (from A+ to A), medium rated (from BBB to BBB-), and  
low rated (from B+ to B) bonds.  The pattern persists for the other pre-listing event windows as 
well, supporting the conclusions of prior research that for a given magnitude of rating change, 
the impact of rating changes is greater for lower rated bonds.  The key difference, however, is 
that our results demonstrate equity markets are reasonably good at predicting the future rating 
change before the firm is placed on CreditWatch, especially for those firms listed with negative 
potential.  The results once again suggest that CreditWatch does not reflect the change in the 
financial positions of listed firms’ timely enough.   
D.  Conclusion 
We examine whether rating agencies are sacrificing timeliness by pursuing rating stability 
by investigating the response of the equity market to the listing and delisting of firms on S&P’s 
CreditWatch, a service whose intended purpose is to improve the timeliness of information about 
changes in credit ratings.  Despite its intended purpose, we find that CreditWatch is not 
completely effective at achieving this goal. 
   We report three empirical results that support our conclusion.  First, we find that equity 
markets experience substantial positive (negative) abnormal returns for companies listed with 
positive (negative) potential on CreditWatch prior to the listing date. The pre-listing abnormal 
returns not only reflect the direction, but also the magnitude of rating changes on the delisting 
date.  Second, equity markets exhibit little reaction to the delisting of a company from 
CreditWatch, even when the delisting is accompanied by a change in   rating.  Third, we find that 
the pre-listing abnormal returns in equity markets are good predictors of both the direction and 
the magnitude of the eventual change in credit.  This is especially true for those firms listed with 
negative potential, which is by far the most common listing type.  Collectively, our findings 
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suggest that rating agencies may sacrifice timeliness for the sake of stability and that even 
CreditWatch, which is designed to mitigate the disadvantage caused by rating stability, is not a 
completely effective instrument. 
If an advance notice service such as CreditWatch is already substantially anticipated by the 
market and too slow in conveying information, credit rating agencies may need to reconsider 
whether a policy of issuing stable ratings is too costly.  In order to repair the reputational damage 
suffered during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, credit rating agencies must develop more 
effective measures to convey changes in default probability to the market in a timely manner. 
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Appendix I:  Credit Rating Transformation 
 
The following is the scale used to transform credit ratings from letters to numerical values, which 
is consistent with Morgan (2002).  Note that the bonds with the highest (lowest) quality receive 
the lowest (highest) numerical score.  
 
 
S&P’s          
Credit Rating 
Numerical 
Rating 
AAA 1 
AA+ 2 
AA 3 
AA- 4 
A+ 5 
A 6 
A- 7 
BBB+ 8 
BBB 9 
BBB- 10 
BB+ 11 
BB 12 
BB- 13 
B+ 14 
B 15 
B- 16 
CCC+ 17 
CCC 18 
CCC- 19 
CC 20 
C 21 
D 22 
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Appendix II: Industry Classification 
 
This table summarizes the breakdown of industries represented in the sample by the first digit of 
the SIC code in Compustat. 
 
1st Digit SIC 
Code 
Positive 
Potential 
Negative 
Potential 
           Total Percent of Total 
0 0 2 2 0.34% 
1 6 31 37 6.34 
2 7 85 102 17.47 
3 25 102 127 21.75 
4 21 114 134 22.95 
5 9 40 49 8.39 
6 11 54 65 11.13 
7 6 36 42 7.19 
8 1 22 23 3.94 
9 1 1 2 0.34 
Total 97 487 584  
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Conclusion 
  My dissertation focuses on the topic of bank opacity, corporate governance, and credit 
ratings.   In the first paper, I use disagreements on dual-rated debt issues by firms to proxy for 
information uncertainty and validate Morgan’s (2002) finding that rating splits are more likely, 
and the magnitude of rating gaps are larger, for banks relative to nonbanks.  Asset composition 
and capital are inherent sources of information uncertainty for banks.  Opacity is more severe for 
banks with higher loan and trading asset holdings and lower risk-weighted capital.  Importantly, 
evidence indicates that participation by banks in mortgage-backed asset securitization increases 
its complexity and opacity.    Additionally, I also discover that rating disagreements reflect 
market proxies of information uncertainty.  Last but not least, markets price information 
uncertainty.   
The second paper emphasizes on the potential prevention of systematic risk.  The results 
suggest that systemic risk is caused by excessive investment in opaque assets.  Further, evidences 
indicate that the over-investments in opaque assets are driven by weak corporate governance in 
compensation mechanism, ownership structure, and board effectiveness in the BHC.   Therefore, 
it turns out that fragile corporate governance leads to excessive investment in opaque assets, 
which in turn leads to systemic risk.   
The third paper investigates the timeliness and stability of default risk announcements made 
by rating agencies.  In particular, I examine whether credit rating agencies, as default risk 
information producers, are effective in balancing two conflicting demands from the financial 
market: to maintain rating stability and to convey timely information to the market.  Evidences 
suggest that rating agencies are too slow in making the announcement of credit watch.  
